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Lee: The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommer

THE PROBLEMS OF "REASONABLE ACCESS" TO
BROADCASTING FOR NONCOMMERCIAL EXPRESSION:
CONTENT DISCRIMINATION, APPELLATE REVIEW,
AND SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND
NONCOMMERCIAL EXPRESSION
WILLIAM E. LEE"
INTRODUCTION

The CBS television network rejected the following Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corporation adve:rtisement' on January 26, 1981:
It's time that America stopped crying Uncle. We can't keep turning
only to Uncle Sam to help us out. For instance, youth unemployment
stands at about 18%7; for minority youth, its a shocking 38%. At Kaiser
Aluminum we believe youth unemployment isn't just government's
problem. It's everyone's. If you're in a position to hire, give America's
young people a chance. One person can make a difference. You2
If Kaiser's advertisement had promoted aluminum products, the network
would have accepted it. Advertisements featuring statements on controversial
issues, however, are not acceptable to the commercial television networks.
Recently the networks' advertising acceptance policies, that permit the promotion of products but not controversial ideas, have come under very strong
attack.3
CBS clearly acted within its legal rights, for the Supreme Court in CBS,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee4 (DNC) held that neither the first
amendment nor the Communications Act require broadcasters to accept noncommercial advertising The DNC Court, however, did not completely resolve
*Assistant Professor, Henry W. Grady School of Journalism and Mass Communication,
University of Georgia. B.A., California State University, 1972; MA., Michigan State University,
1974; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1977. An earlier version of this Article was delivered
as an invited paper to the Association for Education in Journalism, 64th Annual Convention,
East Lansing, Michigan, August 9, 1981. This Article will be published as a chapter in a
book entitled PERSPECTIVES ON THE FiRsT AMENDMENT.
1. An advertisement is a paid form of nonpersonal presentation and promotion of ideas,
goods, or services by an identified sponsor. M. MANDELL, ADVERTISING 6 (3d ed. 1980). The
content of noncommercial advertising may resemble that of public service messages for civic
and charitable organizations, but the latter are broadcast free of charge.
2. Address by Ronald E. Rhody, Advocacy Advertising Mini-Plenary Session, Association
for Education in Journalism 64th Annual Convention, East Lansing, Mich. (Aug. 9, 1981).
3. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, Aug. 11, 1980, at 47-48 (chairman of Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. describes networks as arrogant and irresponsible). It is important to note that
the networks sell time to candidates during campaign periods for the discussion of controversial issues of public importance. Under certain circumstances, noncandidates who support
or oppose candidates have contingent access rights during campaigns. See infra note 83.
4. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
5. Id. at 101-14, 121-32.
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the tension between broadcasters and those who want to purchase broadcasting
time for noncommercial messages, because broadcasters can accept noncommercial advertisements if they choose to do so. Noting a possible solution
to this tension, the DNC Court stated that at "some future date Congress or the
FCC - or the broadcasters - may devise some kind of limited right of access
that is both practicable and desirable."6 One way to create a limited right of
access would be for Congress to enact a statute mandating "reasonable access"
7
for noncommercial expression
In the 1981 case of CBS, Inc. v. FCC8 (CBS), the Court found constitutional
a statute that provided federal candidates with "reasonable access" to the
broadcasting media. CBS increases the likelihood that a similar statute for
noncommercial expression would be constitutional. Drawing upon issues presented in CBS and other recent first amendment cases, 9 this article scrutinizes
problems that would accompany adoption of the reasonable access option.
Initially, a consideration of whether government may enhance opportunities
for expression of a category of speech and whether such enhancement would
affect broadcasters' fairness doctrine obligations is undertaken. Because the
fulfillment of these obligations initially turns upon broadcaster's exercise of
discretion, the second relevant inquiry becomes the appropriate standard for
appellate review of FCC decisions upsetting that discretion. Lastly, the article
examines the difficulties encountered in attempting to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial expression. Considering these questions, however, requires a brief examination of the current controversy over network
advertising acceptance policies.
6. Id. at 131.
7. Dardenne, The Cost of CorporateAdvertising in 1979, PuB. REL. J. Nov. 1980, at 19.
8. 101 S.Ct. 2813 (1981). In 1979"the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee requested
30 minutes of network time to broadcast a documentary outlining the record of President
Carter and his administration. All three networks declined to make this time available. CBS
stated that if it carried the program, the accommodation of requests from other presidential
candidates would involve massive disruptions of regularly scheduled programs. Id. at 2818
n.2. ABC stated that it had not yet decided when it would begin selling time for the 1980
'presidential campaign. Id. at n.3. NBC believed that it was too early in the political season
for paid political broadcasts and feared that it would be required to provide equal opportunities for other presidential candidates. Id. at 2819 n.4. The Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the FCC, charging the networks with violation of 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1976). See infra note 43. The FCC, dividing 4-3 along party lines, found that
the networks had violated the statute, concluding that requests for access must be considered
from the standpoint of the candidate's needs. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. Inc., 74
F.C.C.2d 631, 642 (1979), aff'd sub nom., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980). By a
6-3 vote, the Supreme Court sustained the court of appeals. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, found the statute significantly enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees, 101 S.Ct. at 2821, and that the FCC's standards in enforcing the
statute were correct. Id. at 2826. In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens, found the statute did not enlarge the political broadcast responsibilities of licensees,
id. at 2833-35 (White, J., dissenting), and that the FCC's standards eviscerated broadcaster
discretion. Id. at 2839. While the majority found that the statute properly balanced the first
amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters, 101 S. Ct. at 2830,
Justice White did not address constitutional questions.
9. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (1981); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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Mobil and Kaiser Confront the "Arrogant
and Irresponsible"Networks
Noncommercial advertising 0 has long been a component of public relations
strategy," but in the 1970s expenditures for this form of expression increased
dramatically. 2 Faced with hostile public attitudes, 3 segments of American
business diversified their noncommercial communications beyond image advertisements, such as descriptions of support for the arts, to include explicit
policy positions on public issues, replies to newscasts and stories, and attempts
to encourage citizen participation in the political process.1 4 While newspapers carry the bulk of these messages, 15 most Americans rely on television
as their primary source of information. 6
Two corporations, Mobil and Kaiser Aluminum, have publicly fought with
the networks over advertising acceptance policies. These corporations argue vehemently for access to network television time despite the availability of other
broadcasting facilities1 7 or methods of presentation, such as participation in pro10. Within the advertising industry, noncommercial advertising refers to those advertisements not directly promoting the sale of a product or service. For a definition of commercial
advertising, see infra text accompanying note 50-52. Members of the advertising industry
often use a wide variety of terms such as corporate advertising, advocacy advertising, and
image advertising to refer to noncommercial advertisements. These terms are often used
interchangeably and none of them singularly includes all forms of noncommercial advertising.
Cf. Meadow, The Political Dimensions of Nonproduct Advertising, J. COM. 77-80 (Summer
1981) (examining noncommercial advertisements appearing in newspapers and developing
10 categories of messages). This article does not focus on only one portion of noncommercial
advertising, such as image advertisements, because the dispute over access to broadcasting
has focused on the discussion of issues, which may occur in any form of noncommercial
advertising. Additionally, an access statute that operated only for "advocacy advertisements"
or some other small segment of noncommercial expression represents a constitutionally suspect
system of treating various categories of expression differently. See infra text accompanying
notes 106-11. For discussions of noncommercial advertising, see generally S. SEmHI, ADVOCACY
ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS (1977); Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image
Advertising: A Discussion of the Factors that Distinguish Those Corporate Image Advertising
PracticesProtected Under the First Amendment From Those Subject to Control by the Federal
Trade Commission, 51 J. URB. L. 405 (1974); Ludlam, Abatement of Corporate Image Environmental Advertising, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 247 (1974); Note, The Regulation of CorporateImage
Advertising, 59 MINN. L. REV. 189 (1974).
11. S. CuTmn' & A. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PuBLIc RELATIoNS 422-48 (5th ed. 1978).
12. From 1974 to 1980 "corporate" advertising expenditures increased by 86.6% for
companies, and 88.9% for associations. Dardenne, The Cost of Corporate Advertising, PuB.
R.FL. J., Nov. 1981, at 38.
13. See, e.g., J. McLin, Coping with a Hostile Environment: Public Affairs Response By
the U.S. Oil Industry, (April 1981) (unpublished paper prepared for the Scallop Corp.)
(Americans believe major oil companies conspire together to keep oil prices high); Address
by Jock Elliott, Association of National Advertisers, Chemical Group, Houston, Texas (Apr.
7, 1981) (only 15% of the population regards the chemical industry as socially responsible).
14. For a brief discussion of the array of noncommercial messages presented by corporations in newspapers, see Meadow, supra note 10, at 77-80.
15. See Dardenne, supra note 12, at 30-31.
16. The Roper Organization Inc., Evolving Public Attitudes Toward Television and
Other Mass Media, 1959-1980, at 3-4 (1981).
17. A 1980 survey of television stations in the largest 50 markets revealed that 89% of
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grams like "Issues and Answers." Three factors explain the desirability of purchasing network television time. First, network television delivers a much larger
and demographically distinct audience than that reached through advertisements placed adjacent to the op-ed page in leading newspapers. Second, the
purchase of network time, instead of time from individual stations in various
markets, sharplyreduces the number of transactions necessary to assure national
coverage. Consequently, network television advertising offers significant economies of scale. Finally, the purchase of time provides the advertiser with editorial
control, a key element lacking when a corporation presents its viewpoint as
part of a news story or interview program. As the following discussion shows,
Mobil and Kaiser have sought access to network television time in order to
counter network news stories and to present their views on controversial
issues.
On October 24, 1979, CBS reported that Mobil's third-quarter profits were
131% higher than those of the same quarter in 1978. Mobil responded with a
275,000 campaign, placing two-page advertisements in leading newspapers
including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles
Times.18 One page sought to explain the increases in third-quarter profits by
offering "19 dull and unsensational facts" not presented on television."9 The
advertisement stated that when television newscasts improperly report the
news, an inability to purchase air time prevents private industry from correcting the broadcasters' inaccuracies. The advertisement alleged the networks had
refuse dto sell air time, even though Mobil offered to purchase rebuttal time
for use by critics of its position. After observing that network policies result in
public misunderstanding of important issues, the advertisement concluded: "To
bring the facts out, Mobil has taken this means of responding to CBS 'reporting'
of our third-quarter earnings. But ads like this cannot possibly have the impact
of network news broadcasts. Television's information blackout is, we suggest,
the real 'rip-off' of the American people." 20 The other page attacked the
manner in which CBS prepared its story and charged that the network had
21
engaged in "shoddy" journalism resulting in biased and careless reporting.
Mobile continues to push for network acceptance of noncommercial advertising, repeatedly publicizing its confrontation with the networks through
printed advertisements. For example, in March, 1981, Mobil publicized a letter
from CBS rejecting a proposed Mobil advertisement that addressed a public
issue. Mobil concluded that such letters were "really death notices in the
marketplace of ideas" and asserted "a responsible news organization shouldn't
2
be sending them." '
In 1979, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation joined Mobil in the
fight for network television time when the three commercial television nettelevision stations would accept advertising that discussed controversial issues. Dardenne,

supranote 7, at 18.
18.

BRoADcAsmNG,

19.
20.
21.
.22.

Atlanta Const., Nov. 6, 1979, at 12A.
Id.
Id. at 1SA.
BROADcAsmG, Mar. 23, 1981, at 75.

Nov. 12, 1979, at 80.
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works rejected Kaiser advertisements dealing with such controversial issues
as government regulation of business. Kaiser protested the networks' actions
in advertisements appearing in leading newspapers, 23 and Kaiser executives discussed the problem with ten United States Senators, 24 some of whom expressed interest in sponsoring legislation that would require access for noncommercial advertising.25 Kaiser's chairman also testified on access problems
26
at a House Subcommittee on Communications hearing.
In 1980, ABC broadcast a segment on its "20/20" program charging that
Kaiser had intentionally marketed unsafe aluminum wire. Kaiser countered
this program with an advertisement placed in leading newspapers charging
7 Kaiser beABC with "grossly misleading and inaccurate statements....
lieved the program constituted a personal attack under the fairness doctrine8
and asked the FCC to order ABC to provide ten minutes of free time for a
Kaiser reply during "20/20."29 The three networks' journalistic practices and
their refusal to sell time for controversial issue advertising led Kaiser's chairman to accuse the networks of being arrogant and irresponsible.2 0
In the face of the Mobil and Kaiser campaigns for access, the networks
have presented three arguments. First, such advertising would trigger the
fairness doctrine's requirements. If unable to sell time for an opposing viewpoint, the network would be required to give free time for a reply or to
include replies in news or public affairs programs. Network officials strongly
oppose giving away valuable time or being forced to discuss issues the network's news staff considers unnewsworthy. 31 Second, the networks claim that
the discussion of public issues belongs in a journalistic format where trained
journalists can "present the facts and varying viewpoints in a fair and accurate manner. " 32 The networks argue that permitting corporations to discuss
issues would provide the public with an unbalanced mix of opinions and ideas.
June 25, 1979, at 72.
24, 1979, at 48.
25. Interview with Ronald E. Rhody, Vice President, Public Relations and Advertising,
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., in East Lansing, Michigan (Aug. 9, 1981).
26. Federal Communications Comm'n-Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-4 (1979) (statement of Cornell C. Maier).
27. Atlanta Const., Apr. 29, 1980, at 12C.
28. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1980).
29. BROADCASTING, Feb. 16, 1981, at 48-49. Kaiser withdrew its petition when ABC carried
a Kaiser response during the July 24, 1981 premiere of "Viewpoint," a program which
examines journalism issues. BROADC'ASTNG, Aug. 3, 1981, at 50.
30. BROADCASTING, Aug. 11, 1980, at 47.
31. BROADCASTING, Sept. 24, 1979, at 48. See generally Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C.
'.576 (1963). The threat of triggering the fairness doctrine, and the possibility of litigation
over a licensee's treatment of opposing views serve as major obstacles to the acceptance of
noncommercial advertising. Repeal of the fairness doctrine, however, will not open up network
television for the presentation of bizarre views on obscure topics. The networks are concerned
with audience flow and probably would not accept advertising that causes viewers to tune to
another network. Moreover, those with sufficient financial resources to purchase network time
would be unlikely to discuss anything other than "mainstream" issues that are of interest to
a diverse audience. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 2.
23.

BROADCASTING,

24.

BROADCASTING, Sept.

a2.

BROADCASTING,

Apr. 13, 1981, at 144.
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Finally, the networks claim that the sale of advertising for the discussion of
issues would allow a few voices - the voices of the affluent - to exert a disproportionate influence in the marketplace of ideas. 33 Mobil and Kaiser have
criticized these arguments 4 with little impact on network management. 35
The conflict over access to network television has now expanded to include entities other than Kaiser and Mobil. For example, in 1982 CBS refused
to sell time to the American Nurses Association for advertisements criticizing
proposed federal health care budget cuts. 36 In a related development, the FCC
upheld its Broadcast Bureau's ruling that political action committees do not
have a right of reasonable access to broadcasting.3 7 As more entities are denied
broadcast time for noncommercial expression, the pressure for congressional
intervention increases. A variety of legislative solutions might be employed to
correct this problem,3 s ranging from elimination of content regulations, such
as the fairness doctrine, to imposition of increased content regulation through
a mandatory access system.
The assumption that the only politically feasible solution to this problem
involves the repeal of content regulation may well be wrong. In recent years,
Congress has repeatedly failed to enact bills to repeal or amend the
fairness doctrine39 and the equal opportunities requirements.40 In addition, key
33. Id.

34. See, e.g., EurroR & PuBaUssr., Nov. 22, 1980, at inside front cover; Rhody address, supra
note 2.
35. In 1981 ABC began a one-year test of issue advertising during its late-night entertainment programming. BROADCAMSNG, Mar. 16, 1981, at 150-54. The time period, available at
$32,000 a minute, has met with underwhelming response. A Mobil official asked "Who wants
to discuss issues a minute after midnight?" BROADCASTING, July 6, 1981, at 38. Advertisers
perceive this time period as a "bad buy" for issue advertising. Address by Robert Purcell,
Advocacy Advertising Mini-Plenary Session, Association for Education in Journalism 64th
Annual Convention, East Lansing, Michigan (Aug. 9, 1981).
36. BIRoADAING, Apr. 12, 1982, at 8.
37. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 51 RAn. REG. (P & F) 233 (1982). See
infra note 83.

38. Kaiser has suggested four options for eliminating the problem of access for noncommercial advertising: changing the law to provide a "limited right of access;" changing
the law to provide that broadcasters may not reject controversial material simply because of
it's content; regulatory redress eliminating the Fairness Doctrine, or exempting commercial
time from Fairness Doctrine application, which would remove broadcasters' fear of economic
loss; working with broadcast management itself to secure the necessary policy changes that
would allow issue-oriented and/or controversial material to be accepted. Dardenne, supra
note 7, at 19. Kaiser has pursued the latter option, but has warned that if broadcasters are not
responsive to access requests, legislators and regulators may adopt one of the first three
options. Id. Kaiser's pursuit of the fourth option, however, has not been successful, as the
discussion accompanying notes 23-35 supra reveals. An examination of solutions other than a
limited right of reasonable access extends beyond the scope of this article. Tor other approaches to a right to purchase time for noncommercial expression, see infra note 42.
39. See, e.g., First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 22 Before the
Subcom. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
40. See, e.g., Repeal of "Equal Time" Requirements: Hearings on H.R. 6013 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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members of Congress remain strongly committed to broadcast content regulation.41 This article proposes, for discussion purposes, a reasonable access
statute modeled after one found constitutional in the context of political
campaigns.
A ReasonableAccess Statute for
Noncommercial Expression
Many different proposals have been advanced for a right to purchase
broadcasting time for noncommercial expression, ranging from a requirement
that broadcasters set aside a certain percentage of time for this use to the establishment of below-cost rates for those speakers with meager financial resources. 42 No commentators, however, have closely analyzed the application
of a reasonable access approach to noncommercial expression. This article
presents, but does not advocate the adoption of, a statute closely modeled after
section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,4 3 the reasonable access provision
for federal candidates.
The proposed statute would provide: "The Commission may revoke any
station license or construction permit for willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for
the use of a broadcasting station by any person for noncommercial expression."
Like section 312(a)(7), the proposed statute does not require broadcasters to
provide free time to speakers who lack the resources to purchase time. A broadcaster may adopt the policy of providing access time only to those who can
purchase it. A broadcaster who adopts the policy of not permitting the purchase of access time, however, would be required to give reasonable amounts
of free time.4 4 Moreover, the proposed statute, like section 312(a)(7), does not
41. For example, Rep. John ]3. Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, recently stated that until there is "real and robust diversity" in the electronic
media and "structural controls such as access channels are in place and shown to be
meaningful, the fairness doctrine and political access requirements will continue to be important safeguards of the public's right to hear opposing and controversial views and to be
well informed during elections." BROADCASTING, Mar. 8, 1982, at 41. Senator Ernest F. Hollings,
a key figure in the Senate, also recently stated his strong support for content regulation in
broadcasting. BROADCASrG, Apr. 12, 1982, at 62. Representative Al Swift recently stated that
congressional repeal of broadcast content regulation "will never happen." Interview with
Rep. Al Swift, in Leesburg, Va. (May 21, 1982).
42. See, e.g., Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade:Access to Radio and Television, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 723, 756-57 (1972) (one block of access time available at standard
rates; another block of time available free or at submarket rates); Comment, Right of Access
to the Broadcast Media for Paid Editorial Advertising- A Plea to Congress, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 258, 312 (1974) (10% of the amount of time sold for commercial advertising shall be set
aside for paid editorial advertising); 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 125, 136 (1973) (access time available
to those who can find persons or an organization willing to purchase a corresponding amount
of time in opposition).
43. Section &12(a)(7) provides that the FCC may revoke a license or construction permit
"for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal Elective office on behalf o1' his candidacy." 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
44. See, e.g., Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Pub. Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 537
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specify segments of time that must be provided, such as a sixty-second spot,
but allows requests for program-length segments.
The proffered statute differs from section 312(a)(7) in two significant ways.
First, section 312(a)(7) applies only to a narrow class of speakers during a
campaign period.45 The proposed statute is designed to apply at all times to
all persons.' 6 Second, while section 312(a)(7) applies only to expression in
behalf of a candidacy, the proposed statute does not select a category of noncommercial expression, such as speech advocating a point of view on a controversial issue of public importance, for special status. The proposed statute
assumes that commercial and noncommercial expression can be treated
differently, reflecting the former's diminished protection under the first
amendment. 47 The provision does not distinguish among categories of noncommercial expression receiving full protection under the first amendment,
which would be a constitutionally unacceptable distinction." Applying the
proposed access statute to a narrow category of speakers and category of
expression poses serious constitutional problems 9 that these modifications are
designed to avoid. As this article reveals, by departing from section 312(a)(7)
in these two ways, the proposed statute's defects become more subtle, although
equally troublesome.
A significant aspect of the proposed statute is the distinction between com-

mercial and noncommercial expression. Commercial expression can be defined
as speech referring to a specific brand name product or service that does not

advertise an activity the first amendment protects 60 In addition, the speaker
(1972). Noncommercial educational stations operating on channels reserved for noncommercial
educational use, noncommercial stations not operating on channels reserved for educational

use, and nonprofit stations that are not educational, such as religious stations, would not
be required to sell time for noncommercial expression. They would be required, however,
to provide free time under the proposed statute. When giving such time, these stations may
charge for production-oriented services. The sale of advertising represents one possible option
currently being explored as a form of funding for public broadcasting stations. BROADCAM NG,
Oct. 19, 1981, at 59-60. This option, though, has encountered serious criticism. See, e.g.,
BRoAD ASTING, Nov. 23, 1981, at 65.
45. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2830 (1981).
46. A person would include any individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, organization or groups of persons.
47. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771- n.24 (1976).
48. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2897-99 (1981). By focusing
on noncommercial expression that is fully protected under the first amendment, this article
does not address the problems raised by noncommercial broadcast expression, such as indecency, that has less than full protection under the first amendment. See FCC v. Pacifica

Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (1978).
49.

Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Coim'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,

537 (1980) (the first amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints but also to prohibition of public discussion of an

entire topic); City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 US. 167, 175 (1976)

(participation in public discussion of public business

cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals).
50. Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New
Constitutional Doctrine,44 U. Cm. L. REv. 205, 236 (1976). For analysis of competing defini-
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must have financial interest in the advertised product's sale or service, or in
the sale of a competing product or service. 51 While this definition would in
most instances easily segregate pure commercial speech from pure noncommercial speech, hybrid messages containing references to both a brand name
product and to editorial commentary on public issues would be problematic.
Hybrids are treated as commercial expression if the product references could
be deleted with no loss of meaning or implication for the remainder of the
5 2

message.

ENHANCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPRESSION

In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo 5 3 presented one of the most interesting constitutional developments in recent years. In finding public financing of elections
constitutional, the Court stated this system was not designed "to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital
to a self-governing people. Thus, it furthers, not abridges, pertinent first amendment values."5 4 The similarity between the Buckley Court's position on election
financing and the CBS Court's position on use of a public resource, the electromagnetic spectrum, is striking. In CBS, Chief Justice Burger stated that the
candidate access statute "makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to
receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic
process." 5 But such government intervention in the marketplace of ideas
must operate in a nondiscriminatory manner,5 and the CBS Court did not
scrutinize section 312(a)(7) for its discriminatory effect.
Speech relating to the political process undoubtedly exemplifies the essence
tions, see id. at 222-36. This definition is more elaborate than any the Court has employed.

See infra text accompanying notes 213-68.
51. Comment, supra note 50, at 232. See infra text accompanying notes 266-76.
52.

Id.

53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted).
55. 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2830 (1981).
56. For example, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckley, Justice Rehnquist
stated that an election financing system may treat candidates from major parties differently
from minor or independent parties, but any differences in treatment must meet a stringent
standard of judicial review to insure no discrimination exists in violation of the fifth and
first amendments. 424 U.S. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Rehnquist found the system of election financing in Buckley to be unconstitutional
because it "enshrined the Republican and Democratic parties in a permanently preferred
Chief Justice Burger agreed with Justice Rehnquist that the election
position .
Id.
I.."
financing system distinctly disadvantaged minor parties or independent candidates and
warned against discriminatory legislation. Id. at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In the realm of freedom of expression, the first amendment's interest in equal liberty
does not mean that the government may suppress all individuals equally. Cf. Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (the first
amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic).
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of self-government.57 An equally important first amendment principle, however, is that the government may not restrict the speech of some to enhance
that of others."" The latter principle's logical corollary is that enhancement
of opportunities for a class of speech by a class of speaker may place certain
viewpoints and speakers at a disadvantage. 9 An access statute's effects may be
very similar to those of a restriction on certain speakers and viewpoints. Because such effects present grave first amendment problems, this section
explores the first amendment analyses of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court opinions in CBS.
The Court of Appeals and the Constitutionality
of Section 312(aXZ)
In its review of the constitutionality of section 312(a)(7) in CBS, 0 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit clearly gave priority to the
public's right to be informed, and radically minimized broadcasters' editorial
discretion. The court of appeals based its decision on the congressional
authority to allocate broadcast frequencies and the reduced first amendment
rights of broadcasters who use such frequencies. Although Senior Circuit Judge
Bazelon has questioned the scarcity rationale as a justification for broadcast
regulation,6 ' he claimed in his opinion in CBS that the scarcity rationale is
most valid when applied to VHF television.62 Under the settled doctrine that
government retains the power to decide "how and to whom to allocate the air
waves," 63 he argued section 312(a)(7) represented a reallocation of the use of
portions of the air waves from the licensee to the candidate.To support the constitutionality of this position, Judge Bazelon cited NBC
v. United States," a case that has been criticized on first amendment grounds
57.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).

58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (there is an equality of status in the field of ideas). See generally
Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727
(1080); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. RW-v. 20
(1975); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of SubjectMatter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 81 (1978).

'59. See Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 ,F.Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. .1980). The Greenberg court
held that a special third class postal rate for "major" political parties violates the first
amendment rights of "new" political parties. The district court stated that "in a competitive
intellectual environment assistance to one competitor is necessarily a relative burden to the
other." Id. at 778.
60. 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aJJ'd,101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
61.

See, e.g., Bazeon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.

213, 223.
62. 629 F.2d at 25 n.114. Judge Bazelon's reference to VHF stations is somewhat troubling
because § 312(a)(7) also applies to other broadcast services. It is unlikely that he meant that
§ 312(a)(7) applies only to VHF television stations. Rather, he was probably emphasizing that
VHF channels, which appellants utilize for their owned and operated stations, are the most
limited of the channels allocated by the 'FCC.
63. Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
64. Id.
65. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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as too sweeping in the scope of regulation it implies. 68 Moreover, NBC referred only to grants of licenses and license renewals, not reallocation of time
once a license has been granted. More to the point, he cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,67 where the Supreme Court stated in very sweeping language
that the first amendment "confers no rights on licensees to prevent others from
broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly
of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use."68
Although this passage literally means that any system of "reallocation" is acceptable under the first amendment, not all access systems are constitutional.
Each allocational scheme must be assessed according to its effect on the broadcaster's speech, the extent of "reallocation," and whether the system compromises the government's neutrality.
On the first of these analytical points, Judge Bazelon noted that section
312(a)(7) provided an affirmative right of access, not a contingent right of
access.69 Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo7Oentailed a contingent right
of access, and the Supreme Court, in finding the statute in question to be
unconstitutional, feared that newspaper editors would censor themselves to
avoid triggering the access provision. 71 Judge Bazelon noted the absence of
such effects under section 312(a)(7), concluding that the statute did not impair the broadcaster's "journalistic discretion" to editorialize.7 2 Although the
court viewed this feature of section 312(a)(7)'s operation as critical,7 s a lack of
chilling effects can be expected in an affirmative access system. The critical
issues for such a system are the extent of the "reallocation" and the system's
66. In NBC, the Court stated that freedom of expression is necessarily abridged in
broadcasting because facilities are inherently limited by the laws of physics. Id. at 226. To
suggest that the need for licensing eliminates or substantially reduces the first amendment
protection of those to whom licenses are awarded is a dangerous proposition. As the late
Professor Harry Kalven stated, the traditions of the first amendment "do not evaporate because there is licensing. .. . The question is not what does the need for licensing permit the
Commission to do in the public interest; rather it is what does the mandate of the First
Amendment inhibit the Commission from doing even though it is to license." Kalven,
Broadcasting,Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. L. & ECON. 15, 37 (1967). See also
Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market": The Supreme
Court on the Structure and Conduct of Mass Media, 32 VAND. L. RE-. 1249, 1320-21 (1979);
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. R.v. 67, 87-88 (1967).
67. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
68. Id. at 391.
69. 629 F.2d at 10-11. Professor Benno Schmidt defines contingent access systems as those
that are triggered by a prior publication. Affirmative access systems exist regardless of prior
publications. B. ScHmnyr, JR., FREEDOM oF rTa PRSs vs. PUBLIc Accass 17 (1976).
70. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute granting political candidates equal space to answer
newspaper attacks violates the first amendment).
71. Id. at2 57.
72. 629 F.2d at 25 (footnote omitted).
73. The fact that Judge Bazelon found this to be important can be explained in part by
his narrow view of the scope of journalistic discretion. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. By defining journalistic discretion more broadly, see infra note 75, however, the
question of coercive effects becomes an important area of inquiry. The CBS court did not
investigate this area.
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impact on the government's neutrality. The CBS decision evidenced a dis-

turbing and superficial analysis of these crucial issues.
The court of appeals' narrow view of "journalistic discretion" is helpful in
assessing the second analytical point, the extent of the reallocation. This
point has two dimensions: first, how much time does the "reallocation" affect
and second, how much control does the broadcaster retain over who will use
the "reallocated" portion of time. Judge Bazelon correctly concluded that in
the first dimension only a limited amount of time was affected because the
statute applied only to federal candidates advancing their candidacies during
a campaign. 4 In the second dimension, however, he suggested a rather disturbing analysis. As in earlier cases,-h first amendment protection for decisions concerning who will be sold broadcast time was subordinated to the
protection accorded decisions concerning the content of those segments in
which a broadcaster speaks. This view entitles the latter to strict protection
under the first amendment, while the former may be subjected to a reasonableness requirement. The court accepted this result because the speech involved
74. 629 F.2d at 24-25. Even if only a small segment of time is affected, the "reallocation"
plan must be scrutinized according to the amount of discretion the broadcaster retains in
determining who will use those segments of time. Cf. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (FCC rules requiring cable systems operating at least 20 channels to dedicate
four channels to nondiscriminatory access impose common-carrier obligations upon those
systems). Judge Bazelon's analysis of this question ignored legislative intent. See infra notes
180 & 181 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1175 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting rehearing en banc) (deciding
whether to accept an advertisement for broadcasting time already set aside for such purposes
involves no exercise of "journalistic discretion'). See generally Business Executives Move For
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 US. 94 (1973) (broadcasters' first amendment interests in
allocating advertising time are weak because their speech is not at issue). But see CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973) (licensee refusal to accept editorial advertising is based on journalistic judgment of priorities and newsworthiness).
In DNC, the case most relevant to the question of the scope of a broadcaster's journalistic
discretion, Chief Justice Burger stated that "editing is the selection and choice of material."
Id. at 124. The Chief Justice did not describe journalistic discretion as applying to only those
segments in which a broadcaster "speaks." Judge Bazelon's approach to journalistic discretion
presents the difficult problem of distinguishing those segments in which a broadcaster
"speaks" from those in which his facilities are used for the speech of others. The relevant inquiry becomes whether a network-produced program constitutes an affiliate's "speech" in
the same sense as a station editorial. The allocation of advertising time, like the selection
of other types of programming, entails judgment. See supra note 31. It is fallacious to view
the selection of advertising as being markedly different from the selection of other programming. Courts would look very carefully at a regulation forbidding a station from engaging in a particular category of expression. Likewise, they should look very closely at a
statute compelling a broadcaster to permit others to use his facilities for a particular category
of expression. The court of appeals' limited view of the scope of journalistic discretion
closely relates to its limited examination of the effects of the statute. See supra note 73. Of
course, the overreaching assumption in CBS is that Congress may limit a broadcaster's
freedom when the public interest requires it to do so. The underlying concepts of scarcity
and the power of government, which form the basis of this assumption, may be severely
criticized. See supra note 66; infra note 95.
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was of a special nature7 6 and because the statute did not impair a broadcaster's
right to speak and editorialize.
Even if one accepts that broadcasters' decisions regarding to whom time
will be sold should be accorded diminished protection, a governmentally imposed access system must be analyzed to determine whether it compromises the
government's neutrality. The court of appeals did not consider this analytical
point beyond briefly analogizing section 312(a)(7) to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions. 77 This analogy and the cases cited to support it draw immediate reference to public forums such as parks, streets, and other facilities
held in public trust for the purpose of facilitating assembly, communication,
and discussion of public issues.7 These facilities, however, must be administered
in a manner that maintains government neutrality toward speakers, subjects,
and viewpoints. The public forum is a species of content-neutral analysis.9
Assuming that the inquiry involved access to a park, and candidates who discussed their candidacies received preferred treatment over other speakers and
subjects, a court would have difficulty reconciling such a system of access with
public forum law as it has developed.80

76. 629 F.2d at 24 (no speech is more protected than political speech).
77. Id.at25n.116.
78. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See generally Cass, First Amendment Access
to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979); Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. R-v. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233.
79. Stone, supra note 58, at 88.
80. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) in which the Court stated:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public
facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up
to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.
Id. at 96 (footnote omitted). Although this passage is written from the standpoint of selective
denials of access to a public forum, the concept of neutrality underlying Mosley also applies
to situations in which the government enhances certain speakers' opportunities for expression.
For example, in Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559
(1981), the Court reversed a state court decision that granted access to a public forum to all
groups, but gave special status to one religious group. The Court stated:
None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a
church ritual entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior
to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do not purport
to ritualize the process. Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy rights
to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other
organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize. These
nonreligious organizations seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights
equal to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views,
whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature.
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Furthermore, if Judge Bazelon's analogy referred only to an access system
that selects a certain class of speaker and broad subject, but does not discriminate among viewpoints those speakers held, 81 the government's neutrality
may still be compromised. It is fallacious to assume that candidates alone have
information valuable to the political process. One important development in
recent elections has been the involvement of groups such as the Moral Majority.82 Yet section 312(a)(7) does not cover noncandidates such as single issue
groups and political action committees; therefore, their views concerning a
candidate or issue may not be presented to the electorate via broadcasting. 8

Id. at 2566. The concept of neutrality evident in Mosley and Heffron should also apply to
mass media regulation.
Although neutrality also applies to mass media regulation, public forum cases present
different first amendment issues than do media access cases. Thus, Judge Bazelon's analogy
to public forums seems strange because a public forum does not have an editor. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (distinguishing Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US. 241 (1974), from access to a shopping center because
such access would not intrude into the functions of editors).
81. In his concurring opinion, Judge Tamm referred to the time, place, and manner
analogy and stated that broadcasting regulation may to some extent slip into a concern
about content, but "it may not lose sight of the fundamental requirement of neutrality as
between particular speakers or viewpoints." 629 F.2d at 31 n.7 (Tamm, J., concurring). This
passage indicates that Judge Tamm believes a broadcast access provision such as § 312(a)(7)
may be concerned about content insofar as it establishes a category of expression, such as
political speech, for special status. But cf. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (a constitutionally permissible time, place, or
manner restriction may not be based either upon the content or subject matter of speech).
Party affiliation or a candidate's viewpoint, however, would not be acceptable factors in
determining access in Judge Tamm's view. The thrust of his concern for neutrality involved
FCC enforcement of § 312(a)(7) that would favor or hamper certain candidates. 629 F.2d at
32-33 (Tamm, J., concurring). He did not address the effect of the statute on noncandidates.
82. See generally L. Johnson & C. Bullock, III, The New Religious Right and the 1980
Congressional Elections (Mar. 17, 1982) (unpublished paper presented at the "1982 Annual
Convention of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Texas).
83. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. Of course, broadcasters may sell time
to such groups for discussions of controversial issues and many broadcasters do so. A great
number of stations, however, refuse to sell time for political discussions by noncandidates.
Telephone interview with Patrick O'Driscoll, National Conservative Political Action Committee (May 14, 1982). Those stations that do sell time to noncandidates for political discussions carefully consider the content of the messages and often refuse requests for time
because of the content of the messages. Id.; Telephone interview with Harriet Matthews,
Progressive Political Action Committee (Feb. 25, 1982). In contrast, a federal candidate has
a right to reasonable access, and the content of a candidate's proposed message cannot be a
factor in assessing a request for such access.
The FCC's recent action in National Conservative Political Action Comm., 51 R.n. REG.
(P & F) 233 (1982), emphasizes the differences between candidates and noncandidates. One
NCPAC technique opposes certain candidates through broadcast advertisements. NCPAC,
however, has had difficulty in obtaining broadcast access in certain regions. In 1981 NCPAC
sought a declaratory ruling from the FCC that political action committees, like federal candidates, have a reasonable right of access to broadcasting. The FCC upheld a Broadcast Bureau
ruling that only federal candidates have a reasonable right of access to broadcasting. Id. at
234-35. Thus, while stations have statutory obligations to provide time to federal candidates,
noncandidates have no affirmative access rights.
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Any distinctions the government would make in this area must be tailored to
serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for such distinctions must be carefully scrutinized.8 The court of appeals did not subject
section 312(a)(7) to this analysis and erroneously assumed that the statute was
nondiscriminatory.
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Section 312(aX7)
In holding section 312(a)(7) constitutional, the Supreme Court, like the
court of appeals, seriously limited broadcasters' editorial discretion. The decision stated that this discretion may be limited when it is in the public
interest.s To properly understand the CBS decision one must recognize that
the Court perceives the need for broadcast content regulation and understand
the special status of political speech under the first amendment.
The CBS majority's analysis of section 312(a)(7) centered on the statement
that it "is the right of the viewers and listeners,not the right of the broadcasters
which is paramount."86 When read in light of another passage stating there
Noncandidates do have contingent access rights during campaign periods under the
Zapple doctrine. In 1970 the FCC ruled that when a station sells time to an authorized
spokesman, individual, group, or organization supporting the election of candidate A (and A
does not appear in the broadcast), it would be unreasonable for the station to refuse to sell
time to an authorized spokesman, individual, group, or organization supporting the election
of candidate B. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 708 (1970). The Zapple doctrine does not
require free time for the supporters of candidate B unless free time was given to the
supporters of candidate A. Id. at 708. Zapple applies only during campaign periods, see The
Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 34, 44 (1974), and does not apply to "fringe" party
candidates. See, e.g., Ed Clark for President Comm., 87 F.C.C.2d 425, 427 (1980); Dr. Benjamin
Spock, 44 F.C.C.2d 12, 18-19 (1973). Unauthorized committees making independent expenditures have Zapple contingent access rights. See Carter./Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 81
F.C.C.2d 409, 421 n.19 (1980). See also 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(f)(2) (1981) (defining unauthorized
committees); id. § 109.1 (defining independent expenditures). In 1980 the Broadcast Bureau
ruled that the Zapple doctrine does not apply to independent organizations that do not
speak for any particular candidate but merely oppose candidates. You Can't Afford Dodd
Comm., 78 F.C.C.2d 658, 660 (1980). The Commission, however, refused to affirm the
Bureau's interpretation of Zapple. You Can't Afford Dodd Comm., 48 RAn. REG. (P & F) 425,
428 (1980). Since the Zapple doctrine emanates from the fairness doctrine, and the issue in
an election is which of the candidates should be elected, see Dr. Benjamin Spock, 44 F.C.C.2d
12, 18 (1973), it makes little sense to distinguish between speech by those who support a
candidate and those who merely oppose candidates. Expression by both groups contributes
to discussion of the issue.
84. Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 US. 455, 461-62 (1980) (government regulation discriminating
among speech-related activities mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be
carefully scrutinized). For the Court's most recent application of this type of scrutiny, see
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981) (university may not exclude religious groups from
facilities available to other groups).
85. 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981). See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
110 (1973) (only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh private journalistic
interests will government power be asserted).
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2829 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390

(1969).
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"is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others,"'' 7 one sees that the Court
believes the government may impose affirmative obligations upon a broadcaster
to ensure the public receives access to diverse views. This position implicitly
recognizes the broadcasting marketplace will not function fairly or efficiently
without government content regulation.8 To reject the proposition that a
broadcaster must be subjected to content regulation to assure diversity,S9 one
need not disagree with the proposition that listener interests are paramount.
A.structurally diversified broadcast press, free from government content regulation, may better serve the public interest than one whose programming
decisions are subjected to close governmental scrutiny. The Court, however,
perceived no significant first amendment problems in the system of governmental scrutiny accompanying section 312(a)(7).
An earlier decision 0 dealing with governmental scrutiny of programming
decisions demonstrated that review of past programming decisions is not censorship.91 If censorship is construed narrowly to refer to only prior restraints, then
reviewing programming decisions does not constitute censorship. But the Court
has stated the first amendment secures more than mere exemption from prior
restraint. 92 The first amendment also protects against the chilling effects postpublication penalties pose, a doctrine used, for example, to insulate the press
from post-publication libel awards that would deter criticism of government
93
officials.
In CBS, the Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, found the absence
of chilling effects under section 312(a)(7) very important. The Court emphasized the statute "did not impair the discretion of broadcasters to present their
views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming."- But as a
87. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)). In Red Lion

this passage continues by stating that broadcasters must present those views and voices that
would otherwise be barred from the airwaves. 395 U.S. at 389. Since the FCC believes that
discussion of political issues constitutes a key component of the public interest standard, it is
unlikely candidates would be barred from the air waves without § 312(a)(7).
88. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2827 n.12 (giving licensees a "blank check" to determine what

constitutes reasonable access would eviscerate § 312(a)((7); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (personal attack and political editorial rules of the fairness doctrine
are necessary because without them broadcasters would have unfettered power to communicate only their views and to permit only those on the air with whom they agreed); CBS,
Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Tamm, J., concurring) (potential evil in leaving
the question of access in the hands of private broadcasters), majority aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813

(1981).
89. Judge Bazelon, for example, has concluded that content regulation has failed to
achieve diversity and content-neutral structural regulation would be a preferable manner of
seeking diversity. See Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"- New Directions
in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 Fm. CoM. LJ. 201, 209-11 (1979). In broadcasting,
the Supreme Court has approved structural regulation as a means of seeking diversity. Ser
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). See generally Lee,
supranote 66, at 1328-35.
90. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
91. Id. at 735-38. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
92. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,7,15 (1931).
93. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964).
94. ,101 S. Ct. at 2830.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss3/2

16

Lee: The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommer
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. xxxIv

noncontingent form of access, section 312(a)(7) cannot be expected to deter
broadcasters from presenting their own views. Protection from. chilling effects
and prior restraints, however, does not exhaust the first amendment's protection, and the statute could also have been examined for any coercive effects
95
that might accompany governmental review of programming decisions.
Nevertheless, the CBS Court did not search for such coercive effects.
The Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, found that due to the enforceable obligations accompanying the use of a public resource, 96 Congress
may limit a broadcaster's discretion in allocating time. Because the statute
significantly enhanced freedom of expression by promoting the presentation
and reception of political communication, 9 7 the Court found the statute a valid
95. The problem of governmental scrutiny of programming decisions goes far deeper
than the number of rulings that upset the discretion of a broadcaster. The expense and
time involved in defending a decision, even when the FCC sustains that decision, may be
great. For example, Sherwyn H. Heckt, 40 F.C.C.2d 1150 (1973), a fairness doctrine case
resolved in favor of the licensee, involved legal expenses of about $20,000 and 480 hours of
station personnel time. First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 22 Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp.,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978) (statement of Henry Geller). Although the prospect of defending a denial of reasonable access does not chill future expression, the expense and time
involved may cause broadcasters to feel compelled to publish material that they otherwise
would not. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (access
statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding publication of specified matter). Additionally, the prospect of defending a categorization of a hybrid
message, see infra text accompanying notes 265-75, may intensify the feeling of coercion a
broadcaster experiences. To argue that these effects merely create greater opportunities for
expression via broadcasting ignores the autonomy broadcasters should have under the first
amendment.
The CBS Court did not pursue the question of coercion. If it had, a majority of the Court
would have been likely to find these coercive effects to be constitutional. First, as the Court
noted, a broadcaster who receives a license is "'burdened by enforceable public obligations.'"
101 S. Ct. at 2829 (quoting Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). Second, in another recent case involving governmentally
required access to a facility, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980),
the Court stated that because the government did not dictate specific messages, the access
provision did not constitute the type of impermissible government action found in Wooley
v. Maryland, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), or West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). On the other hand, these reasons may be criticized on the following grounds. First,
the system of requiring certain obligations of broadcasters in exchange for their use of a
"scarce" resource rests upon a dubious treatment of the concept of scarcity. For criticism of
the scarcity argument, see Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a
Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6-17 (1976); Lee,
supra note 66, at 1309 n.373; BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1981, at 36; Address by Mark S. Fowler,
International Radio and Television Society, New York, New York (Sept. 23, ,1981); Letter
from Erwin G. Krasnow & Barry D. Umansky to Rep. Timothy E. Wirth (Dec. 17, 1981).
Second, the mere fact of licensing should not alter the first amendment's hostility to content
regulation. See supra note 66. Third, government compulsion of a specified message differs
only in degree from an affirmative access system that sharply limits broadcaster discretion.
See infra notes 176-80 & 196-206 and accompanying text. Fourth, the autonomy of the press
presents issues that are different from those of public forum cases, see supra note 80, and the
Court's conclusion in Pruneyard is inapplicable to a media case.
96. 101 S.Ct. 2829.
97. Id. at 2830. The Court stated that "'it is of particular importance that candidates
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exercise of congressional power. Although legislative determinations cannot

limit judicial inquiry into first amendment issues,98 the Court's decision gave
great deference to congressional findings. The ,CBS Court did not analyze
whether the statute really enhanced opportunities for candidates to advance
their candidacies or whether any increase in access justified the increased

governmental scrutiny of broadcasters. Even if positive answers had, been
obtained from searching inquiries into both areas, a very important question
remains concerning government neutrality in the marketplace.
It is striking to note that in cases involving speech restrictions based upon
the identity of the speaker 9 or the subject, 100 the Court has emphatically
stated that such actions are antithetical to the first amendment. The CBS

Court, facing an enhancement of expression opportunities for a narrow
category of speakers rather than a restriction on speech, simply did not examine
section 312(a)(7)'s impact on governmental neutrality.:01 By granting reasonable access to all candidates regardless of political persuasion, 02 the statute
appears to be viewpoint neutral on its face; but the fact that a broadcaster may
refuse all requests for free access means that federal candidates having sufficient

funds will receive significantly greater access than those that are poorlyfunded. 0 3 This disparity greatly skews the marketplace in favor of certain
have the . . . opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public
issues before choosing among them on election day."' Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
US. 1,52-53 (1976)).
98. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
99. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 583 (1980) (a regulated monopoly is entitled to freedom of speech); First Nat'J
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (the inherent worth of speech does not
depend upon the identity of its source); City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (participation in public
discussion of public business cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals).
100. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 537 (1980), (the first amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints but also to prohibition of public discussion of
an entire topic); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980) (labor picketing deserves no more
first amendment protection than public protests over other issues); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) (in the realm of protected speech, a legislature
may not dictate the subjects about which a person may speak); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (the government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views).
101. Since the Court did not examine § 312(a)(7) for discriminatory effects, hopefully the
Court would not find such effects to be constitutional in the broadcasting context. In the
public forum context, the Court has found unconstitutional a system of access that provided
access for all groups, but conferred special status upon one group. See Heifron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2566 (1981); supra note 80.
102. By analogy, one commentator concluded that the Court has had considerable
difficulty in coping with restrictions that are "defined in terms of expression about an entire
5ubject rather than a particular viewpoint or idea." Stone, supra note 58, at 99.
103. While certain federal candidates are entitled to public funds for their campaigns,
the manner of distributing these funds does not eliminate the content-discriminatory effects
of § 312(a)(7). See I.R.C. § 9004 (1976); supra note 56. Of course some amounts of free time
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candidates. It is erroneous to believe well financed candidates represent the
spectrum of political views.
Section 312(a)(7) also places noncandidates who wish to participate in the
political process via broadcasting at a disadvantage to federal candidates.
Broadcasters have no statutory obligation to sell time to noncandidates. Since
the fairness doctrine does not cover candidates' section 312(a)(7) "uses" of broadcasting, broadcasters need not provide opportunities for noncandidates to
present views opposing the candidates'.10 4 If the FCC construed the fairness
doctrine to apply to section 312(a)(7) "uses" when a candidate discusses a
controversial issue of public importance, broadcasters might fulfill fairness
doctrine obligations by selling or giving time to persons or groups presenting
an opposing viewpoint on that issue. The candidate, however, would determine the agenda of issues to be discussed. 10 5 The broadcaster could prohibit
will be given by both commercial and noncommercial broadcasters. This amount will be
small for commercial broadcasters because free time for one candidate requires free time for
all other candidates for that office. This aspect of 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976) has been widely
criticized as a barrier to the effective use of broadcasting for political communication. See
generally Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S.382 Before the Subcomm.
on Privileges & Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules & Ad., 92d Cong., Ist Sess., (1971);
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, 6 S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The predominance of commercial broadcasting in terms of audience size and the preference
of broadcasters to sell time rather than give it away means that well-financed candidates will
reach more people more often than poorly-financed candidates. One, commentator has argued
that the equal protection clause prohibits the media from providing advertising time or
space to only those candidates who can pay for it. Comment, A Constitutional Remedy for
the High Cost of Broadcast and Newspaper Advertising in Political Campaigns, 60 CAmr. L.
Ray. 1371 (1972).
104. See The Law of Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2301 (1978);
Gloria W. Sage, 62 F.C.C.2d 135, 136 (1976); The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 47 (1972).
In general, "any broadcast or cablecast of a candidate's voice or picture is a "use' of a station
or cable system by the candidate if the candidate's participation in the program or announcement is such that he will be identified by members of the audience." 69 F.C.C.2d at 2240.
Appearance by candidates on four types of news programs have been declared by Congress
not to be uses:
(1)bona fide newscasts, (2) bona fide news interviews, (3) bona fide news documentaries
(ifthe appearance by the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject
or subjects covered by the news documentary), or (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide
news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental
thereto).
47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(l)-(4) (1976). One commentator concluded that these four exemptions to
§ 315 deter third party candidates. Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27 Mn. L. Rav. 221, 237 (1967).
105. If the fairness doctrine were applied to § 312(a)(7) uses, and candidate X purchased
time under the provision to discuss his opposition to prayer in public schools, a single-issue
group opposing abortion on demand would not be entitled to purchase or receive free time
to state its opposition to candidate X because of his record favoring abortion on demand. In
DNC the Court believed that if the fairness doctrine required broadcasters to provide time,
free when necessary, for the presentation of views opposing those carried in a noncommercial
advertisement, "the affluent could still determine in large part the issues to be discussed."
CBS, Inc, v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973). In addition, establishment of
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statements on issues the candidate does not address, even when an individual
or group considers those issues important to the public's evaluation of the
candidate's fitness for office. Applying the fairness doctrine to section 312(a)(7)
"uses" can only diminish the discriminatory effects of section 312(a)(7); it cannot eliminate the problem.
If one assumes that section 312(a)(7) operates in a viewpoint-neutral manner
for candidate political expression, a significant question remains concerning
government action favoring certain classes of communication over others. In
Metromedia,Inc. v. City of San Diego21 decided the day after CBS, the Court
found unconstitutional a billboard ordinance treating various classes of content
differently. Dissenting opinions argued the ordinance did not discriminate
among viewpoints or subjects 0 7 and thus was "essentially neutral" to the
messages conveyed. 0, The plurality opinion considered neutrality to mean
the government cannot favor certain communicative contents over others.l 9
a free or submarket rate system for poorly-financed individuals and groups raises "incredible
administrative problems." Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections
on Fairnessand Access, 85 HAw.rL. REv. 768, 789 (1972).
The agenda setting function of media messages led two authors to conclude that the mass
media "may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful
in telling us what to think about." D. SssAw & M. McCoMns, THE EMERGENCE OF AMEIUCAN
POLITICAL Issuas 5 (1977). See generally Adams, Network News Research in Perspective: A
Bibliographic Essay, TELEVISION NErwoRK NEws 30-S1 (W. Adams & F. Schriebman eds.
1978). A group complaining, that a broadcaster has not permitted coverage or discussion of
an issue is not likely to be successful. The fairness doctrine's requirement that broadcasters
devote a reasonable percentage of time to the discussion of controversial issues of public
importance has played a minimal role in fairness doctrine cases. See Comment, Enforcing
the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 137, 146 (1975). Partially due to the subjective nature of determining
which issues are of public importance, broadcasters are given great discretion under the
fairness doctrine to determine which issues to cover. See The Handling of Pub. Issues Under
the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C2d
1, 11-12 (1974). Once a broadcaster covers an issue, however, it must provide an opportunity
for presentation of contrasting viewpoints. One commentator concluded that broadcasters risk
more by providing programming on controversial issues than by ignoring such issues.
Chamberlin, The FCC and the First Principle of the Fairness Doctrine: A History of Neglect
and Distortion,31 FED. Com. L.J. 361, 408 (1979).
106. 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
107. Justice Stevens asked whether there was any reason "to believe that the regulation
is biased in favor of one point of view or another, or that it is a subtle method of regulating
the controversial subjects that may be placed on the agenda for public debate?" Id. at 2915
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He concluded that there was not "even a hint of bias or censorship
in the city's actions." Id. Chief Justice Burger similarly concluded that the ordinance "in no
sense suppresses freedom of expression, either by discriminating among ideas or topics or by
suppressing discussion generally.' Id. at 2920 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
agreed with the views of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens. Id. at 2924 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens disagreed with the conclusion of the
plurality and the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan that sufficient alternative avenues
.for expression remained unavailable. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 2897 and id. at 2901 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment) with id. at 2915 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and id. at 2921
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2920 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. 101 S. Ct. at 2898. The plurality also rejected the notion that neutrality could refer
to restrictions that apply equally to either side of a public controversy. Id. See Consolidated
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By favoring certain classes of messages, such as on-site commercial advertising
and temporary political campaign signs, San Diego compromised its governmental neutrality. 110 While section 312(a)(7) enhances the opportunities for
expression of a class of speech and does not involve restrictions like the San
Diego ordinance, section 312(a)(7) favors one class of messages over others.
Surprisingly, none of the justices in CBS analyzed section 312(a)(7) under the
neutrality concept utilized in Metromedia."'
Applying the plurality's analysis in Metromedia to section 312(a)(7) clearly
indicates the government has selected a class of expression for favored status."

2

If the special problems of broadcasting permit such governmental regulation,
the statute still must not discriminate among viewpoints. 113 Section 312(a)(7)
operates in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner in that poorly-funded candidates
are disadvantaged in comparison to well-financed candidates. If the statute
does not discriminate among the viewpoints federal candidates hold, it still
places noncandidates at a disadvantage, contrary to the first amendment's
intent. 1 The question, however, remains whether the proposed access statute
for noncommercial expression would alleviate the problems section 312(a)(7)
poses.
The Constitutionality of the
ProposedAccess Statute
The Court's approach to section 312(a)(7) in CBS readily demonstrates
Congress can impose access obligations upon broadcasters in exchange for use
of a public resource. Although there may be some limitations as to the extent
of the obligations that can be imposed upon broadcasters, it is unlikely that
the proposed access statute would raise issues of sufficient magnitude to proEdison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (the first
amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic).
110. 101 S. Ct. at 2898. CI. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 316 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discrimination among entire classes of ideas, rather than among
points of view within a particular class, is not less odious under the first amendment).
111. In his dissenting opinion in CBS, Justice Stevens seemed to accept the permissibility
of enhanced opportunities for political expression, but warned that the FCC might evaluate
broadcaster decisions not to grant access in a manner that favors certain candidates. 101 S. Ct.
at 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 81. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
101 S. Ct. 2882, 2917 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the fact that a city permits additional
communication to occur during a campaign is surely consistent with the first amendment).
112. Because Metromedia involved a general prohibition on outdoor signs that allowed
certain exceptions to the prohibition, the case can be distinguished factually from CBS. See
101 S. Ct. 2882, 2885 n.1, 2886 n.3 (1981). CBS did not involve prohibition on speech, but
rather an enhancement of only political speech. Section 312(a)(7) places expression not covered
by the provision at a marked disadvantage to political speech by federal candidates. See supra
notes 83, 103-05 and accompanying text.
113. In their dissenting opinions in Metromedia, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens
did not find the different treatment of various classes of expression to be unacceptable. 101
S. Ct. 2882, 2916 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2923-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Both
stressed, however, that they believed the ordinance operated in a viewpoint-neutral manner.
See supra note 107.
114. See supra note 99.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 2

1982]

"REASONABLE ACCESS" TO BROADCASTING

voke the judiciary to limit congressional authority to impose such obligations.115
The Supreme Court has traditionally given great deference to congressional
judgments in broadcasting regulation. If Congress deemed it necessary to adopt
the proposed access statute, so that individuals could have greater opportunities to broadcast noncommercial expression, the Court would probably accept
this judgment. This acceptance, if following the treatment of section 312(a)(7)
in CBS, would not entail an inquiry whether the proposed statute was necessary
or whether any increase in access offset the increased governmental scrutiny
over broadcast programming decisions.
The proposed statute is free from one of section 312(a)(7)'s major defects;
it is not limited to a narrow class of speakers. Any individual would be able
to request time under the proposed statute to reply to views federal candidates
using section 312(a)(7) present.:" 6 Moreover, those who want to present issues
candidates or others do not discuss would be able to use the proposed statute.
The statute would increase opportunities for. noncommercial expression via
broadcasting in a manner that would correct some of the imbalances section
312(a)(7) created. The proposed statute does, not treat various classes of noncommercial expression differently;" 7 therefore, it does not violate the plurality's
position in Metromedia.
On its surface the proposed statute appears to be viewpoint and subject matter neutral. Nevertheless, the statute would produce the effect of
content discrimination. 18 It can be assumed broadcasters would provide
minimal amounts of free time to those who could not afford to purchase
it."19 Those who would benefit the most from the proposed statute would
be those with sufficient resources to pay, for example, $67,000 for a thirty-second
prime time network television spot. 20 This point does not suggest the affluent
115. The proposed statute differs from § 312(a)(7> in two important ways: the proposed
statute would apply at all times and would not be limited to a narrow class of speaker.
These differences, however, are really only a matter of degree, as the following reasons
demonstrate. First, due to the frequency and length of federal campaigns, § .12(a)(7) may be
in effect more often than not. Second, under both § &12(a)(7) and the proposed statute, broadcasters may refuse requests for free access. Thus, although the proposed statute applies to a
much broader class of speakers than § 312(a)(7), only the affluent will be very successful in
gaining significant amounts of access. (Finally, both statutes share the concept of reasonableness as a standard for access and as a measure of the degree of a broadcaster's discretion.
116. This does not mean that § 312(a)(7) uses by candidates would no longer be exempt
from the fairness doctrine. See supra text accompanying note 104. Rather, by establishing
an affirmative right of access for all speakers, the proposed statute counteracts the fairness
doctrine exemption for uses of a broadcasting station by a candidate. Since the proposed
statute also applies to candidates, a use under the statute would be treated like other uses
for fairness doctrine purposes.
117. The proposed statute assumes that treating commercial and noncommercial expression differently would be acceptable. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
118. Both Professor Kenneth Karst and Professor Geoffrey Stone conclude that contentneutral regulations may have content differential effects. See Karst, supra note 58, at 35; Stone,
supranote 58, at 102-03. Cf. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 54
STAN. L. Ra,. 113, 130 (1981) (content-neutral regulations should receive the same scrutiny
as content-based regulations).
119.

See supra note 103.
HEAD & C. STERLiNG,

120. S.

BROADCASTING

IN AmmucA 369 (4th ed. 1982). The figure
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share monolithic views121 or that by virtue of their deep pockets they would
be able to convert everyone to their views. Provocative speculation, however,
does suggest that by purchasing time more frequently than others, the affluent
may well be very successful in determining what issues and problems broadcast
audiences think about. 22 The fairness doctrine would also exacerbate the
agenda-setting function of access under the proposed statute by requiring
presentation of opposing views as a response to debates the affluent initiated.
Moreover, if a broadcaster did not initiate discussion of a topic under the
fairness doctrine, and the nonaffluent could not afford to purchase time under
the proposed statute to discuss that topic, viewpoints on the topic would not
be presented via broadcasting.
The proposed access statute would significantly increase governmental
scrutiny of broadcast programming. First, broadcasters would be called upon
to defend their decisions not to grant reasonable access. Second, broadcasters'
fairness doctrine obligations would markedly increase. By enhancing opportunities for discussion of controversial public issues, the proposed statute
would also require broadcasters to assess whether an advertisement discussed
an "issue." 123 If it did, an opportunity for presentation of opposing views
would have to be arranged somewhere in the stations' programming. These
decisions would be subject to FCC scrutiny, and as the Court feared in DNIC,
the FCC would be required to "oversee far more of the day-to-day operations
of a broadcaster's conduct .... 12 One critical variable in determining whether
the risk of sacrificing broadcasters' first amendment protections outweighs the
gains the statute poses involves the type of appellate review given to FCC
decisions that overturn a broadcaster's judgment.
THE RiEVIEWING COURTS AND THE

FCC

The possibility of biased Commission treatment of candidates' complaints
under section 312(a)(7) raises grave first amendment problems. FCC Commissioners, appointed by the President and subject to great congressional pressure,
have rendered arbitrary decisions designed to favor one political party over
another.12 5 A major question in CBS is the amount of deference an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute and reasoning are entitled to upon
review. Assuming, arguendo, the constitutionality of broadcasting content review, the manner in which the FCC approaches content regulation may still
affect significant first amendment interests. The manner in which a reviewing
given indicates the average cost for the 1979-1980 season and would be higher under current
rates. The segments available for issue advertising on ABC are much cheaper than prime
time segments. See supra note 35.
121. Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.22 (1978) (corporations,
like individuals or groups, are not homogeneous).
122. See supra note 105.
123. See generally Simmons, The Problems of "Issue" in Administration of the Fairness
Doctrine, 65 CALF. L. REv. 546 (1977).
124. 412 U.S. 94, 1,27 (1973).
125. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (arbitrary decision by the
FCC requiring reply time for Republicans in response to a Democratic National Committee
broadcast which was a response to Presidential views).
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court analyzes the FCC's interpretation of statutory authority and reasoning
affects the degree of autonomy broadcasters are given. Appellate review can
thus ensure broadcasters, whose programming decisions the government
scrutinizes, are accorded the greatest degree of freedom permissible.
This section does not address the full range of questions a reviewing court
may consider, such as whether an FCC action is constitutional.26 The section
focuses instead on judicial review of FCC decision-making. Outside the administrative law setting, the Supreme Court recently stated that "regulation
127
of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial review."
By analogy, when the FCC overturns a broadcaster's editorial judgment, a reviewing court must not compromise the broadcaster's fragile first amendment
interests merely to preserve administrative discretion.
The members of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the
primary reviewing court for broadcasting decisions, 2 disagree on the standard
of review to be applied when the FCC overturns a broadcaster's judgment.
Those judges who do not believe significant first amendment interests are at
stake in such actions generally apply a limited and deferential form of review. 2 9 In contrast, this article advocates a special standard of review for
those cases in which the FCC overturns a broadcaster's judgment 3 0 The
proposed standard markedly departs from the general practices of the court
of appeals, whose overall intervention in FCC actions has been benign.' s1
Before discussing CBS, this article explores various reviewing standards District
of Columbia circuit judges advocate. 3 2
From the HardLook Doctrine to
Independent Review of Evidence
Judge Leventhal offered a major statement on the relationship between the
FCC and the reviewing court in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
126. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. -FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48-51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977) (FCC rules regulating pay cable television do not withstand scrutiny under
the test established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
127. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102
S. Ct. 454,436 (1981).
128. 47 US.C. § 402(b) (1976).

129. See infra note 148.
130. See infra text accompanying notes -142-46, 154-59.

131. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. Rv. 169, 177 n.20 (1978). See generally Robinson, Co mu c&rioNs
Fop ToMoRRow, The Judicial Role 414-44 (G. Robinson ed. 1978); Paper, Judicial Scrutiny
of the FCC: The Illusion of Usurpation,52 B.U.L. REV. 659 (1972).
,132. This article closely examines the positions of Judge Bazelon and Judge Tamm. The
third judge in CBS, Judge Markey of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, sat by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1976). 629 F.2d at 6 n.*. Although
he ordinarily sits on the customs and patents court, Judge Markey is not a stranger to broadcasting regulation. He also sat by designation with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.* (8th Cir. 1978) (FCC rules imposing
mandatory access upon certain cable systems found to exceed the jurisdiction of the Commission), afJ'd, 406 U.S. 689 (1979).
133. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 92& (1971).
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when he stated the court's function was "to assure that the agency has given
reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues."'31 4 If a court becomes aware, through a combination of danger signals, x35 that the agency 'has
not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making," it must intervene. 1 36 He argued that if

the FCC engaged in reasoned decision-making, the reviewing court should
not intervene even though the court may prefer a policy or result that differs
from the FCC's. By insuring the FCC has taken a hard look, Judge Leventhal
believed that courts became partners with the agency in furthering the public
interest. 137 The hard look doctrine, though, is not required only because FCC
decisions affect freedom of expression, it is required because the agency regulates an industry. 38 In an earlier decision, 39 Judge Leventhal had stated that
although first amendment interests mandate the FCC not be indulged with
exemptions from legal requirements, 40 the agency should not be subjected to
4
unmanageable standards or procedures.1 '

134. Id. at 851 (note omitted). See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792
(1968) (the court's responsibility is to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned
consideration to each of the pertinent factors).
135. In Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (FCC approval of
license transfer without a statement of reasons), the court of appeals stated that when no
hearing is held at which the facts are brought out, promoting confidence that all relevant
facts have been considered, and there is no opinion which provides a reasoned application
of standards to the facts of the case, a combination of danger signals exists that cannot be
ignored by the reviewing court. Id. at 212.
136. 444 F.2d at 851 (footnote omitted). Judge Levanthal, who authored the Greater
Boston decision, is often seen as a strident advocate of the hard look doctrine. See Pikes Peak
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J.) (FCC took a hard
look at predictions of economic injury); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d .1,153, 1156-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J.) (the FCC must take a hard look at a waiver application which
pleads and offers factual material in support of a nonfrivolous first amendment contention).
See also infra note 140.
137. 444 F.2d at 851.
138. See Leventhal, Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the Courts, 1.22 U.
PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
139. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
140. Id. at 1159 (footnote omitted). Judge Wright expressed a similar view in Straus
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530' F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976), stating that fairness doctrine
cases involve first amendment rights and "we cannot indiscriminately apply the principle of
indulgence toward agency action." Id. at 1011 (footnote omitted).
141. 418 F.2d at 1159. Judge Leventhal summarized the process of judicial review of agency
decisions in GreaterBoston:
It begins at the threshold, with enforcement of the requirements of reasonable procedure, with fair notice and opportunity to the parties to present their case. It
continues into examination of the evidence and the agency's findings of facts, for the
court must be satisfied that the agency's evidentiary fact findings are supported by
substantial evidence, and provide rational support for the agency's inferences of ultimate
fact.
444 F.2d at 850 (footnotes omitted). The court must also study the record to "penetrate
to the underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a
reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent." Id.
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Writing for the court in NBC, Inc. v. FCC,142 however, Judge Leventhal
stated the court has a greater than normal responsibility when it reviews FCC
rulings that upset the licensee's exercise of journalistic discretion. 14 Because
the first amendment and the Communications Act give primary discretion to
the licensee, the FCC may overturn a licensee's judgment only when it constitutes an abuse of journalistic discretion. Quoting Judge Tamm's phrase from
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC,144 Judge Leventhal stated: "'Not
xonly must the Commission take a hard look at the case in this light but so
must this court.' ,,a Judge Leventhal interpreted this to mean that the court
must ask "whether the licensee'sjudgments are based on 'such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.' "46
Judge Tamm, writing in support of an order vacating the court's judgment in NBC, stated that Judge Leventhal's position on a special standard of
review for those cases in which the FCC upsets a licensee's discretion departs
from the proper function of a reviewing court.1 4 7 He argued his statement in
Brandywine did not refer to judicial assessment of the reasonableness of a
broadcaster's actions; it referred instead to a careful consideration of constitutional issues.' 48 The hard look doctrine, he suggested, requires an agency to
engage in reasoned decision-making and does not entail the type of review
Judge Leventhal suggested.
Judge Wright, concurring in Brandywine, advocated a third type of review requiring particularly careful scrutiny of license renewal denials14 9 In
such a case,
it is not enough to simply find that substantial evidence in the record
taken as a whole supports the Commission and there was no abuse
of [administrative] discretion. In these circumstances the court itself
should make its own evaluation of the evidence to insure that First
Amendment freedoms of the licensee and the public are fully and fairly
taken into account in the decision making process. 150
142.
143.
144.
145.
52 (D.C.
146.

516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1975).
Id. at 1122.
473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
516 F.2d at 1122 (quoting Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 .7.2d 16,
Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 1206 (Leventhal, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part from the order

vacating the previous judgment) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1-187-88 (Tamm, J., supporting the order vacating the previous judgment).

Judge Tamm stated that Judge Leventhal's position "utterly ignored congressional judgments and Supreme Court precedent, and failed to give any weight, let alone great weight,
to the 'experience of the Commission."' Id. at 1188 (footnote omitted).
148. d. at 1189. Judge Bazelon also stated in NBC that the extraordinary process of

judicial review was improper. He believed that the case raised no first amendment issues,
and thus, Judge Leventhal incorrectly suggested that first amendment interests justified
the new standard of review. Id. at 1174 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from the order vacating

the previous order granting rehearing en banc).
149. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright,

J., concurring).
150. Id. Judge Wright would not employ this approach for all administrative cases.
See generally Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CommR'r L. Ray. 375 (1974).
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To support this position, Judge Wright cited cases advocating an independent
appellate review of evidence to ensure that first amendment standards are
met.15' By analogy, Judge Wright suggested that in certain FCC cases, the
reviewing court should not defer to the FCC's conclusions. To sustain severe
action against a broadcaster, a reviewing court must examine the evidence and
reach the same conclusions as the FCC. This approach approximates the
process appellate courts undertake in cases in which the first amendment
does not protect the expression involved.
The Greater Boston standard of review and the approaches of Judge
Leventhal in NBC and Judge Wright may be distinguished according to the
amount of deference the reviewing court gives the FCC. Under the Greater
Boston doctrine, the court examines the evidence to be certain the FCC has
engaged in reasoned decision-making. When the FCC disagrees with a licensee's
determinations and substantial evidence supports both the licensee and the
FCC, the reviewing court will exercise restraint and sustain the FCC.1 2 Under
151. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright,
J., concurring). The case support judge Wright cited did not involve administrative agencies,
and included Jacobellis v. Ohio, 384 U.S. 184 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941). In Jacobellis, the Court observed that in obscenity cases, as in all others involving
freedom of expression, it cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on
the facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected. 878
U.S. at 190. Concerning review of administrative actions, the Court stated that even "in
judicial review of administrative agency determinations, questions of 'constitutional fact'
have been held to require de novo review." Id. at n.6 (citing as support Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 54-65 (1931), and Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922)). Commenting on this passage, Professor Jaffe stated that "where 'constitutional fact' is in question the
judiciary is less inclined to abide by the usual maxims of deference." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATiVE AcrioN 652 (1965). See generally Strong, The Persistent Doctrine
of "Constitutional Fact", 46 N.C.L. REv. -23 (1968); Strong, Judicial Review: A TriDimensional Concept of Administrative-ConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L. Rav. 249 (1967).
Members of the Court have strongly disagreed with the Court's independent determination
of obscenity. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92-93 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
In New York Times, the Court stated that "this Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make
certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied." 376 U.S. at 285. The Court
felt that the constitutional status of libelous statements regarding the conduct of governmental
officials was such a sensitive one that the Court was required to make its own determination
of the constitutional status of the statements. Id. This examination would involve scrutiny
of the whole record. Id. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). Such an
examination, however, did not violate the seventh amendment. 376 U.S. at 285 n.26. See
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 242-43 (1897). The late Professor Kalven found that this form of judicial review offered
protection against a too facile or disingenuous finding of actual malice. Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr.
RaV. 191, 220. Further support can be derived from Niemotho, where the Court stated that in
cases involving a denial of constitutional rights, "this Court is not bound by the conclusions
of lower courts, but will reexamine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are
founded." 340 U.S. at 271. The Bridges decision closely mimicked this position by observing
that its duty was to determine whether the utterances in question posed a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice. 314 U.S. at 271.
152. NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J., concurring
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Judge Leventhal's approach in NBC, when substantial evidence supports both
the licensee and the Commission, the licensee must prevail.153 Judge Wright's
approach, in contrast, defers to neither the licensee nor the FCC. The requirement that a court reach the same conclusions as the FCC, however, will not
always protect the broadcaster. In certain objective situations, such as the
analysis of licensee deception, the approach of Judge Wright offers great
protection to broadcasters. In more subjective situations, such as analysis of
reasonableness, the open-ended process of a court's reaching its own conclusions - without deference to the reasoning of the licensee or the FCC introduces an element of imprecision that may compromise broadcasters' first
amendment interests.
The assessment of reasonableness in the programming area entails such a
high degree of subjectivity that a reviewing court should find for the broadcaster if adequate reasoning supports the broadcaster's actions. Judge Leventhal's approach in NBC provides great protection to broadcasters while preserving the concept of licensee accountability. Such a system of appellate review will probably err by necessity in the broadcaster's favor. This is necessary
because of the continuing relationship between broadcasters and government
and because any decision adverse to a broadcaster may unnecessarily constrain
other aspects of editorial decision-making. If the Commission will not be

sustained in cases where the evidence supports the competing conclusions of
both the agency and the broadcaster, then it would presumably hesitate to rule
against broadcasters.
Although Judge Leventhal's approach in NBC may be criticized for substantially altering the relationship between the reviewing court and the FCC,
it must be recognized that limited judicial review is not an absolute value.
Limited judicial review "is a resolution of conflicting considerations, a resolution which is valid for most cases."154 The conventional approach appropri-

ately defers to an agency's judgment when, for example, the FCC selects a
policy from a range of options, all of which are legal. The policy-making
function appropriately belongs to the FCC.155 When the FCC finds a broadcaster's exercise of journalistic discretion unreasonable, however, a different
standard of review becomes necessary. To say that the FCC must be sustained
in such situations "so long as there is substantial evidence to support its judgment that the licensee was unreasonable.., would require affirmance even
if the licensee's characterization was not only reasonable but more reasonable
than that of the Commission.-O8 A conventional standard of review would
in part and dissenting in part from the order vacating the previous judgment). See generally

Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971).
153. 516 F.2d at 1205 (Leventhal, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part from the

order vacating the previous judgment);
154. L. JAr'r.supra note 151, at 647 (emphasis deleted).
155. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981); FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775f, 810 (1978). See generally Polsby, F.C.C. v.
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Judicious Uses of Administrative
Discretion, 1979 Sup. CT. Rrv. 1.
156. NBC, 516 F.2d at 1205-06 (Leventhal, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
from the order vacating the previous judgment).
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"subject the licensee to intolerable second-guessing by the FCC," and would
permit the government to interfere unduly with broadcaster discretion. 57 A
special standard of review, in contrast, gives broadcasters greater independence
from government 5 and ensures the FCC does not favor a particular candidate
or political party 59 The autonomy of broadcasters and the government's
neutrality are of greater social importance than preservation of administrative
discretion.
Given the deferential attitudes of Judge Bazelon and Judge Tamm toward
FCC actions in cases decided prior to CBS, one would not expect them to
adopt a new standard of review for a case in which the FCC upsets a broadcaster's exercise of discretion.160 Judge Tamm has argued the court of appeals
departed from its appropriate role in NBC.1 61 In an earlier opinion162 he
stated the FCC's experience in treating fairness doctrine complaints commands
great weight when reviewing Commission decisions in this area. 6 3 In another
illustrative case,16 4 Judge Tamm dissented because the majority did not defer
to the FCC's expert assessment of radio market conditions.The Supreme Court's opinion in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC (NCCB),166 had a major impact on Judge Bazelon's concept of
the limits upon the reviewing court. Judge Bazelon, writing for the court of
appeals in NCCB, ordered the FCC to adopt a rule requiring divestiture of
all co-located newspaper-broadcasting combinations. 67 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that the weighing of policies was a task
Congress delegated to the FCC.168 Prior to NCCB, Judge Bazelon participated
157. Id. at 1206.
158. Independence, as Judge Wright stated, "is perhaps the most important asset of the
renewal applicant." Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
A special standard of review, however, does not completely eliminate the coercive effects
caused by the threat of litigation. See supra note 95.
159. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Judge Wright determined it
imperative that the FCC operate in a fashion completely free from even the appearance of
bias, prejudice and improper influence. This is particularly necessary, he stated, where "the
agency is functioning in the midst of a fierce political battle, where the stakes are high and
the outcome can affect in a very real sense the political future of our nation." Id. at 1027.
See supra notes 81 & 111.
160. In the realm of speech not fully protected by the first amendment, Judge Tamm
closely examined a Commission order and found that it violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C.
§ 326 (1976). See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 ,F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Bazelon
found the FCC's definition of indecency to be unconstitutional. Id. at 20-24 (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court disagreed with both Judge Bazelon and Judge Tamm. See
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738, 740 (1978).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
162. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
163. Id. at 448 (quoting CBS, :[nc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
164. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582
(1981).
165. 610 F.2d at 864-65 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
166. 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978) (Congress has delegated the task of weighing policies
under the public interest standard to the FCC).
167. 555 F.2d 938, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally Lee, supra note 66, at 1328-35.
168. 436 US. at 810.
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in a radio format case 6 9 and stated that courts may intervene with the FCC
to require actions that promote diversity of ideas.170 After NCCB, he participated in another radio format case 7' and stated in concurrence that implementing the public interest standard calls "for a strong dose of policy judgment, a responsibility entrusted by Congress to the FCC." 172 This concurring
opinion indicated the majority's approach, which required the FCC to follow
the earlier decision mandating action to promote diverse ideas, inappropriately
confined the FCC to a spectator's role in formulating policies.1' With these
considerations in mind, the court of appeals decision in CBS will be analyzed.
The Court of Appeals and Review of Broadcaster
Decisions Under Section 312(aX7)
In his opinion for the court of appeals in CBS, Judge Bazelon deferred to
the FCC on the selection of standards used to determine the reasonableness
of broadcaster treatment of section 312(a)(7) requests. Had he examined the

legislative history of section 312(a)(7) - certainly a task for an appellate court
even under a conventional standard of review - he would have found that
the FCC's standards for judging licensee behavior are inconsistent with that
history. The standards the FCC has selected for section 312(a)(7) cases eviscerate
broadcaster discretion in a manner that is violative of legislative intent.
In 1978, the FCC stated that when evaluating requests for access under
section 312(a)(7), broadcasters should consider the candidate's needs, the
number of candidates, and the availability of time. 7 4 To assess whether a
broadcaster has been reasonable in making such a determination, the FCC requires a broadcaster to file a full explanation of any decision not to grant a
candidate's request. The Commission analyzes this explanation according to
two criteria: first, has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards; and
second, has the broadcaster reasonably explained his decision in terms of those
standards."75 The FCC believes that it must ensure the broadcaster has given
a hard look to the relevant factors.

In reviewing the networks' decisions to not grant access to the CarterMondale Presidential Committee in 1979, the FCC suddenly stated that the
foremost factor in section 312(a)(7) cases is the candidate's needs. While the
licensee does retain some discretion to evaluate the reasonableness of candi169. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1740. Id. at 273 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the result).
1741. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582
(1981).
172. Id. at 858 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Judge Bazelon concurred in
WNCN because of the FCC's procedural failures, but agreed with Judge Tamm's dissent on
the role of a reviewing court.
173.

Id. at 859.

174. Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68
F.C.C.2d 1079, 1090 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Policy Statement]. The Commission
added that "an arbitrary 'blanket' ban on the use by a candidate of a particular class or
length of time in a particular period cannot be considered reasonable." Id. (emphasis added).
175. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 642 n.16 (1979).
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dates' requests,"76 the FCC sharply limited broadcaster discretion by elevating
the candidate's needs to the foremost position in section 312(a)(7) cases. Moreover, rather than merely examining the networks' analyses to see if they had
been reasonable, the FCC analyzed the factors itself and in effect offered a
1
more reasonable analysis. 7
176.

Id. at 642. The Commission evaluated licensee discretion as follows:

In taking this factor into account, the licensee is not simply to substitute its judgment
regarding the candidate's needs for the candidate's own assessment of those needs, but
the licensee does retain some discretion to evaluate the reasonableness of that assessment in the broad sense and to weigh that factor against the other factors which
we have said are relevant.
Id. (emphasis added). In the 1978 Policy Statement, the FCC reiterated that a "candidate's
desires as to the method of conducting his or her media campaign should be considered by
licensees in granting reasonable access." 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 174, at 1089 n.14
(emphasis added). The Commission also stated that a candidate's decisions as to the best
method of pursuing his or her media campaign "should be honored as much as possible
under the 'reasonable' limits imposed by the licensee." Id. at 1090. These passages indicate
that a broadcaster cannot arbitrarily deny a candidate's request, but the broadcaster must
consider the candidate's needs along with other factors, and can only deny a request when
the other factors are believed to outweigh the candidate's needs. By considering all factors,
such as a candidate's needs, number of candidates, and availability of time, the broadcaster
obtains a careful balance between "the rights of Federal candidates to fully inform the voters
of the issues involved in a campaign and their positions on those issues, and the right of
the licensees to offer viewers and listeners programming other than political broadcasts."
Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 67 F.C.C.2d 743, 746-47 (1978). To place the candidate's needs
in the foremost position alters this balance.
177. For example, the networks cited the multiplicity of candidates - 122 had filed notices
of candidacy with the Federal Election Commission - and the great equal opportunities requirements attaching to a sale of 30 minutes of time to one candidate. 74 F.C.C.2d at 647.
Drawing upon the experience of the 1976 campaign, CBS noted that in that campaign 15
candidates qualified for a total of more than $24.1 million in federal matching funds and
even minor candidates had purchased network time. Id. at 658. Evidence clearly supported
the networks' determination that at this stage in the campaign, a sale of 30 minutes of time
to one candidate would entail equal opportunities for a large number of candidates. The
FCC, however, concluded only a small percentage of the 122 candidates would become
legally qualified as defined in the Commission's rules. Id. at 647. See generally The Law of
Political Broadcasting 8c Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2216-18 (1978). Moreover, the FCC
stated that "it is highly improbable that all of the 1.22 candidates ... will have the financial
resources necessary to purchase a half hour of network prime time." 74 F.C.C.2d at 647.
Although the networks were not claiming that all 122 candidates would be able to purchase
time, experience shows that at least a substantial number of candidates would afford to
purchase time. The FCC's analysis goes beyond an assessment of whether evidence supports
the networks' decisions and becomes an effort to develop a more reasonable approach. See
supra text accompanying note 156.
In dissent, Commissioner Jones stated the Commission should not "substitute its judgment for that of the networks absent a clear showing that the networks have acted in an
unreasonable manner. In my judgment, the facts of the case provide no such showing." 74
F.C.C.2d at 654 (Jones, Comm'r, dissenting) (emphasis added). Commissioner Lee found
that the networks' reasons for not giving air time evidenced a thoughtful "consideration of
the needs of the candidates, the public, and the networks." Id. at 681 n.l (Lee, Comm'r,
dissenting). Commissioner Washburn stated that the majority's approach "substitutes the
Commission's judgment for the broadcaster's own good faith interpretation of candidate requests and his response thereto. Such governmental intrusion is unwarranted, is illegal and, I

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 2

1982]

"RFASONABLE ACCESS" TO IBROADCASTING

On review, the court of appeals sustained the Commission'7 8 Judge Bazelon
writing for the court, deferred to the FCC's determination that the candidates'
interests were the foremost factor in section 312(a)(7) cases without examining
the legislative history on this point. To permit the broadcaster's discretion to
be as limited as the FCC defined it in this case represents a substantial departure from other areas of broadcast regulation 179 and requires a clear congressional directive. Congress unquestionably intended to establish a system of
access with section 312(a)(7),180 but nothing in the legislative history reveals
an intention to sharply eviscerate broadcaster discretion.81
fear, will have far-reaching consequences that will come back to haunt the Commission and
the public again and again." Id. at 682 (Washburn, Conm'r, dissenting).
178. 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), afj'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
179. For example, broadcasters have great discretion in determining what constitutes a
bona fide news event under § 815 of the Communications Act. The FCC will review these
judgments only according to whether or not the broadcaster intends to promote the interest
of a particular candidate in presenting coverage of a news event. Aspen Inst. Program on
Communications & Soc' , 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 711 n.19 (1975). Moreover, the complainant will
have to provide extrinsic evidence of bad faith by the broadcaster before the FCC will
inquire into news judgment. Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 628, 642 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally
Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 427-28 (D.C. Ci. 1980); Chisholm v.
FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 358-60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 89a (1976). Under the fairness
doctrine, broadcasters have great discretion in how to fulfill their obligations. Complainants
must establish prima facie evidence of the fairness doctrine violation before the FCC demands a response to a complaint. The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
& the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 691, 696-97 (1976). See
also American Security Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607' F.2d 438, 444-46 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). If prima fade evidence warrants a response by the
licensee, the licensee determines, for example, what issue is involved and whether that issue
is controversial and of public importance. The FCC will overturn this judgment only when
reasonableness and good faith are lacking. Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 1001,
1008-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Even with these provisions, the threat of defending a decision has
an impact on a broadcaster. See supra note 95.
180. Judge Bazelon's only foray into legislative history in CBS sought to determine
whether § 312(a)(7) created an affirmative right of access for federal candidates. 629 F.2d at
12-13. Once he found that Congress did create an affirmative access system, Judge Bazelon did
not probe to discover the amount of discretion broadcasters were to have in handling
requests from candidates. This superficial investigation of legislative history may be compared with Judge Robinson's searching inquiry into the legislative history of § 312(a)(7) in
Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 439-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
181. The FCC bases all interpretations of § 312(a)(7) on the premise that one purpose of
the Federal Election Campaign Act, of which § 312(a)(7) was a part, is "to give candidates for
public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the
issues and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters." 1978 Policy Statement,
supra note 174, at 1087. The Commission drew this statement, however, from debate on a
bill that differed significantly from the bill enacted by Congress. As the following discussion
shows, the legislative history cannot support the FCC's position that the candidate's needs
are the foremost concern in evaluating § 312(a)(7) requests.
Hearings and debates on the Federal Election Campaign Act rarely mentioned the
reasonable access provision. In adopting legislation to regulate campaigns, the Senate was
primarily concerned with encouraging broadcasters to provide free time to certain candidates,
without having to provide free time to "fringe" party candidates, by excluding candidates for
certain offices from § 315 of the Communications Act; reducing the cost of broadcast time by
establishing "lowest unit rates" for candidates; and diminishing the advantage wealthy candi-
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dates have over poorly-financed candidates, by limiting the expenditures of a candidate on
communications media. See 1.17 CONG. Rac. 28811-14 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Prouty). See
generally FederalElection Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, & S. 956 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Both the modification of the scope of § 315 equal
opportunities requirements and the establishment of lowest unit rates were designed to give
candidates "greater access" to broadcasting. The House, however, was strongly opposed to limiting the scope of § 315. 118 CONG. REc. 321 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Springer). The bill
enacted by Congress did not exclude candidates for certain offices from the equal opportunities requirements. Retention of equal opportunities for all candidates, therefore, diminishes the meaning of the phrase "greater access."
In 1971 Senators Scott and Mathias proposed a reasonable access provision for all candidates "to assure that those few broadcasters who happen to favor incumbent candidates
cannot continue to do so by forbidding the sale of time to the opposition as well." Senate
Hearings, supra at 348 (statement by Senators Scott and Mathias). The Senate Commerce
Committee rewrote the Mathias/Scott proposal to provide for "reasonable access to or permit
the purchase of reasonable amounts" of broadcasting time. S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 (1971). This provision was limited to federal candidates in conference committee.
S. REP. No. 580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971) The Senate Commerce Committee reported
that the reasonable access provision emphasizes "the public interest obligation inherent in
making broadcast time available to candidates...." S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1971). The reasonable access provision must be read in relation to the lowest unit rate provision adopted by Congress, for the reasonable access provision counteracts the prospect that
broadcasters would either make no or very little time available to candidates because a limit
was imposed on the rate that could be charged for that time. See, e.g., Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings on S.372 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
Although broadcasters were to, sell some amount of time to candidates under the reasonable access provision, the legislative history at no point discussed this provision in a manner
that could support the FCC's position that the candidate's needs were foremost. For example,
Senator Pastore, a key figure in the drafting of this legislation, responded to questions concerning the impact of the lowest rate provision on small broadcasters. He stated that candidates "cannot inundate the broadcasting; it has to be reasonable. In my state the radio and
television announcements tell the people that so much time will be made available for
political purposes. They wait for the applicants to come in and they allocate." 117 CONG.
REC. 29028 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore). If the candidate's needs were foremost, it seems
odd that Senator Pastore referred with approval to a broadcaster practice that does not place
those needs in a foremost position. Following enactment of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-295, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), Senator Pastore's subcommittee considered FCC
enforcement of the reasonable access provision. Dean Burch, Chairman of the FCC, stated
that in assessing reasonableness
a number of variables must be considered- such as the office involved, the number of
candidates for that office, the number of candidates for all offices within the station's
service area, the station's overall coverage of the various campaigns, and questions of
spot versus program time, prime time coverage, and so forth.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 136-37 (1973) (statement
of Dean Burch). Dean Burch sought guidance from Senator Pastore as to whether the FCC
was interpreting the reasonable access provision correctly. Senator Pastore responded that
the FCC's approach was reasonable. Id. at 37 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). If the candidate's
needs were to be the foremost factor, and the FCC did not consider them to be so at that time,
Senator Pastore curiously did not bring the FCC's error to Dean Burch's attention. While
broadcasters clearly were to provide some level of access, no factor was to be primary in a
broadcaster's analysis of a request for access.
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Even if section 312(a)(7)'s legislative history revealed that the candidate's

needs were to be considered paramount, the FCC has not been clear and
consistent in stating its preference for that factor 8 2 Judge Bazelon appropriately noted if "an agency intends to demand that regulated companies consider
and address all relevant factors, it must be clear and consistent in articulating
those factors."'183 In a rather weak moment, he concluded that while the
origins of the FCC's standards may be determined with hindsight, the agency
failed to sufficiently articulate its policy beforehand.' 8 4 Perceiving the FCC's
action as a mere failure to headline its policy - instead of a sudden alteration
of standards to support a result the agency desires l 5 - displays extreme judicial
modesty. Judge Bazelon's belief that section 312(a)(7) cases do not affect journal-

istic discretion ls6 partially explains why he did not view as a major defect
the FCC's failure to emphasize clearly the preferred status of a candidate's
needs prior to the Carter-Mondale complaint. The FCC's looseness in articulating the standard to be applied in such cases apparently did not damage first
amendment interests that Judge Bazelon considered significant. Significant first
amendment interests of broadcasters, however, are involved in section 312(a)(7)
cases, and those interests demand better consideration than the court of
182. Compare Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Pub. Office, 34
F.C.C.2d 510, 536 (1972) (important as an informed electorate is, there are other elements
in the public interest standard) and 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 174, at 1089 n.14 &
1090 (a candidate's needs should be considered by a broadcaster along with other factors)
with Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 642 (1979) (emphasis
placed on candidate's needs). See supra notes 176 & 181. This is not the only area of
§ 312(a)(7) policy in which the FCC has been inconsistent. One commentator concluded that
in a case in which the FCC ordered a station to sell a candidate five minute segments, see
Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d 1265 (1978), FCC policy precedent "could have been
used as authority for any result the majority choose-whether that be ordering the sale
of the 5-minute ads or not ordering such sale." Albert, The FCC Assumes a New Role as
Regulator of Broadcast Advertising and Candidates' Access, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 279, 296

(1980).
183. 629 F.2d at 23.
184. Id.

185. Placing the candidate's needs in a foremost position shifts the weight of factors,
compelling the conclusion that the networks acted unreasonably in denying the CarterMondale request. This perspective has the appearance of partisan politics, a factor that
should never enter into FCC review of § 312(a)(7) complaints. Judge Tamm warned in a
concurring opinion, the "danger of government neutrality under section .12(a)(7) is exacerbated by the Commission's emphasis, in its standards governing the right of access, on the
'individual needs' of the candidate." Id. at 32 (Tamm, J., concurring).
'186. See supra text accompanying note 72. Judge Bazelon's analysis of the way the FCC
determines whether a campaign is in progress illustrates his narrow perception of the concept
of journalistic discretion. He stated that the Commission would be impermissibly involved
in the election process only if it "sought to set a starting date for the campaign, rather than
merely find that it has already begun!" 629 F.2d at 16 (emphasis by court). In his view, a
broadcaster's determination of when a campaign was in progress was not an editorial determination; rather, it addressed a purely legal question and as such the licensee's determination was not binding on the FCC. Id. at 17. See also NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d, 1101, 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting
rehearing en banc) (a legal judgment by a licensee that its programming is or is not subject
to the fairness doctrine cannot be legally binding upon the FCC), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910
(1975). See infra note 192.
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appeals gave them in CBS. When agencies are permitted to act as the FCC18did
7
in this case, the process of judicial review becomes virtually meaningless.
The Supreme Court and Review of Broadcaster
Decisions UnderSection 312(aX7)

The Supreme Court decision in CBS,18 while sustaining the court of appeals,
closely resembled two previous decisions in which the Court had deferred in
large part to the FCC's judgments. 89 These earlier decisions, which involved
weighing competing policies, are situations in which courts traditionally defer
to the administrative agency's judgment. The CBS decision, however, involved
review of an FCC decision that upset broadcaster exercise of discretion; in that
type of case a special standard of review is necessary to protect broadcaster
interests. The consequences of the Court's traditional approach to CBS are
serious. CBS permits partisan application of section 312(a)(7) and sharply limits
a broadcaster's discretion without congressional approval.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found the FCC's actions were
a "reasoned attempt to effectuate the statute's access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their discretion but demanding that they act in good
faith."'. 90 The fact that the FCC's treatment of the Carter-Mondale complaint
clarified the Commission's standards for section 312(a)(7) cases was not a significant factor for the majority.', While the Court reviewed the FCC's
187. The FCC considers the process of review of broadcasters' decisions under § 312(a)(7)
as analogous to that which courts use in reviewing decisions by an administrative agency. See
supra text accompanying note 175. If the FCC follows this analogy closely, it ensures that a
broadcaster has not given a factor an exaggerated and unreasonable weight at the expense
of other factors. See L. JAFFE, supra note 151, at 587. Similarly, the task for the reviewing
court is to ensure that the FCC has not given a factor an exaggerated and unreasonable
weight at the expense of others. Clearly, by placing the needs of candidates in a foremost
position, the FCC gave this factor an exaggerated prominence and this should have been
grounds for reversal by the court of appeals, especially since the legislative history does not
support the FCC's action.
188. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
189. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (the Commission's judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial
deference); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978) (the
weighing of policies under the public interest standard is a task that Congress delegated to
the FCC in the first instances).
190. 101 S. Ct. at 2827 (footnote omitted). The Chief Justice added that the "dissenters
place great emphasis on the preservation of broadcaster discretion. However, endowing
licensees with a 'blank check' to determine what constitutes 'reasonable access' would
eviscerate § 31.2(a)(7)." Id. at 2827 n.12. See infra text accompanying notes 200-11. The majority
opinion greatly overstated the degree of discretion Justice White found broadcasters had
under the statute and FCC policy prior to Carter-Mondale. As provided by the 1978 Policy
Statement, supra note 174, at 1090, a broadcaster had to weigh a candidate's needs along
with other factors and this was subject to FCC review. This hardly constitutes a blank check.
See supra note 176.
191. 101 S. Ct. at 2827. A rather stunning passage referred to network opposition to FCC
promulgation of specific rules for § 312(a)(7) cases, see 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 174,
at 1080-81, and claimed that the networks "must share responsibility for any vagueness and
confusion in the Commission's standards." Id. at 2827 n.13. This simply ignores the fact that
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determination that a campaign was in progress to be certain that it was

supported by evidence, 192 the decision did not analyze the networks' claims
that the broadcast of the Carter-Mondale program would entail significant

equal opportunities requirements. The majority instead unquestioningly
accepted the FCC's judgment that the network claim was speculative and
unsubstantiated. 193 The Chief Justice summarized the Court's deferential ap-

proach by stating that although the Court might not have made the same
determination on the same facts, such a situation does not warrant substitution of judicial discretion for administrative discretion. 19
In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens,
questioned the majority's deference to the FCC. The dissent argued the FCC
violated legislative intent, was inconsistent in its policy, and substituted its
judgment for that of the networks. The FCC's assertions of deference to
editorial judgment were described as "palpably incredible."' 9 5
the standards established in the 1978 Policy Statement were different from those applied by
the FCC in analyzing the Carter-Mondale complaint. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying
text. Like Judge Bazelon's reference to the fact that the FCC could have better headlined its
policy, see supra text accompanying note 174, Chief Justice Burger's statement demonstrates
extreme tolerance for very loose administrative agency practices.
192. 101 S. Ct. at 2828. As did Judge Bazelon, Chief Justice Burger concluded that a
licensee determination of when a campaign is in progress "is not, and cannot be, purely one
of editorial judgment." Id. at 2826. See supra note 186. In dissent, Justice White charged that
by making the start of a campaign a question of law, the FCC overstepped its authority. Id.
at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). The FCC's "objective analysis" of when a campaign has
begun inherently accorded little deference to the conclusions of the networks. See 74 F.C.C.2d
at 645-46, 665-66. In addition, this approach was not contained to the question of when a
campaign is in progress. The FCC also gave little deference to the networks' reasoning on
the question of equal opportunities requirements that would attach to the Carter-Mondale
program. See supra note 177.
193'. 101 S. Ct. at 2828. See supranote 177.
194. 101 S.Ct. at 2829 (quoting FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946)). Chief
Justice Burger added that courts should not overrule an administrative decision merely because they disagree with its wisdom. Id. (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. United States, 341
U.S. 412, 420 (1951)). The Chief Justice's citation of WOKO and RCA is interesting because
neither case involved first amendment questions. A deferential approach is appropriate in
such a setting.
In RCA, however, Justice Frankfurter made a very interesting observation. While noting
that he was no friend of judicial intrusion into the administrative process, Justice Frankfurter
stated that
so long as Congress has deemed it right to subject the orders of the Commission to
review by this Court, the duty of analyzing the essential issues of an order cannot be
escaped by too easy reliance on the conclusions of a district court or on the indisputable
formula that an exercise of discretion by the Commission is not to be displaced by a
contrary exercise of judicial discretion.
341 U.S. at 423 (Frankfurter, J., dubitante) (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter's special
concern about the consequences of the FCC's ruling in the RCA case prompted his emphasis
on careful judicial review. In cases where the FCC overturns a broadcaster's discretion, the
great impact on first amendment interests justifies more intensive scrutiny than Chief Justice
Burger employed in CBS.
195. 101 S.Ct. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens)
(footnote omitted).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss3/2

36

Lee: The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommer
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

The majority noted the FCC's construction of a statute should be followed
unless there are compelling indications that such a construction is wrong 96
and examined legislative history to find only that section 312(a)(7) created an
affirmative access system. 197 Justice White agreed an affirmative access system
had been established, 19 but found the FCC "almost totally ignored the legislative history as a possible limitation on the reach of the broadcasters' duty to
provide reasonable access or upon the scope of its oversight responsibilities."'199
The dissent concluded the statute was not designed to sharply limit broadcaster
discretion, and in the absence of unequivocal legislative intent to do so, the
20 0
FCC could not assume that it had authority to impose such restrictions.
Justice White stated the amount of deference given an administrative
agency's construction of a statute depends upon the thoroughness of its reasoning and its consistency with earlier pronouncements. 20 1 He found the FCC's
sudden emphasis upon the candidate's needs inconsistent with earlier policy
statements. 202 This shift in standards had grave consequences, because the networks' decisions to deny the Carter-Mondale request became unreasonable only
when the candidate's needs were placed in a foremost position.203 This "highly
skewed" approach violated the traditionally recognized discretion of broadcasters.204 The dissent further argued that by accepting the FCC's approach,
the majority opened broadcasters to any reasonable demands for airtime by
candidates who would themselves determine the necessity of such programming
to their campaign strategy. Commission involvement obviously accompanies
this unworkable scheme, although no statutory basis exists for imposing such
2 5
a broad system of access. 1
The conclusions the majority and dissent reached in CBS illustrate the
consequences of differing types of appellate review of administrative agency
action. The majority treated this case as though the most important issue was
the degree to which agency decisions should be subject to appellate review
and reversal. Consequently, the majority looked at whether the evidence
196. Id. at 2823 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
,197. Id. at 2821-23. The majority emphasized that one of the primary purposes of the
Federal Election Campaign Act was to give candidates greater access to the media. Id. at 2822.
As discussed earlier, see supra note 181, the phrase "greater access" is drawn from discussion
of a bill that differed substantially from that enacted by Congress. See infra note 199.
198. 101 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2834. Justice White noted that the lowest unit rate provision provided "greater
access." See supra notes 181 & 197. Section 312(a)(7), he believed, was aimed at "preventing
the charge limitation from reducing the access that might otherwise be available." Id. (footnote omitted).
200. 101 S. Ct. at 2833. See generally id. at 2831-33.
201. 101 S. Ct. 28.13, 2835 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting St. Martin Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 101 S. St. 2142, 2148 n.13 (1981)). In St. Mfartin, a case
involving an exemption from unemployment compensation taxes for church school employees,
the Court did not defer to a Department of Labor construction of the term "church" under
I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1). 101 S. Ct. at 21,18-49. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944).
202. 101 S. Ct. at 2835-37 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 176 & 182.
203. 101 S. Ct. at 2840.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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supported'the FCC's conclusions concerning reasonable access and gave great
deference to the FCC's judgment. The CBS Court fulfilled Judge Leventhal's
fears in NBC: when an appellate court takes a traditional approach of deference toward the agency, the FCC will be sustained even though evidence also
supports the broadcaster's reasoning. 206 The dissent, on the other hand, considered the most important issue to be the degree to which broadcaster judgments should be subject to FCC review and reversal. While considering the
reasonableness of the networks' actions, the dissent stressed the requirement
that administrative agencies be dear and consistent in articulating standards.
This perspective closely resembled that of Judge Leventhal in NBC.
Grave consequences stem from the CBS decision, as Justice Stevens noted
in his separate dissenting opinion, because the focus on the candidate's needs
creates "an impermissible risk" that political considerations will bias FCC
evalu'ations of a given refusal. 20 The FCC must review section 312(a)(7) cases
in a manner that neither favors nor discriminates against certain candidates.
Unfortunately, the CBS Court's approach suggests the FCC can take partisan
actions and expect very limited and deferential appellate review.
The Implicationsof CBS for Review of
BroadcasterDecisions Under the
ProposedAccess Statute
In Through the Looking Glass, a rather confused Alice confronted
Humpty Dumpty:
"I don't know what you you mean by 'glory,"' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't- till
I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for youl"'
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice

objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master that's all." 208

The facts of CBS remind one of the capriciousness with which Humpty Dumpty
attached meanings to words, for the networks did not know the FCC's new
meaning of reasonableness until after they had acted on a request for access

under section 312(a)(7). Reasonableness was defined to mean just what the
FCC chose it to mean, even though this definition lacks support in the legislative history of section 312(a)(7). When the FCC measures a broadcaster's
206. See supra text accompanying note 156.
207. 101 S. Ct. at 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 94 (spec. ed. 1946). Commissioner Robinson
has also used thd passage as the basis for commentary on the fairness doctrine obligations
of broadcasters. The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 707 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissent-

ing).
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conduct, the broadcaster is not completely the master of his own will. Appellate courts, with their expertise in protecting constitutional liberties, must
ensure broadcasters are not unnecessarily subjected to the FCG's will. Unfortunately, the deferential behavior of the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court in CBS offers scant hope that appellate courts will prevent unnecessary
FCC involvement with broadcasters under the proposed access statute.
If analysis of the proposed access statute follows the pattern of CBS, a
rather disturbing scenario emerges. First, even in the absence of clear legislative intent to do so, the FCC would be permitted to interpret the proposed
statute as requiring substantial limits on broadcaster discretion. By placing
the speaker's needs in the foremost position, the FCC would not only limit
discretion, but would also provide for a marked increase in scrutiny of broadcaster decisions and for an increased risk of partisan enforcement of the proposed statute. As noted earlier, 20 9 the proposed statute poses content discrimination problems. To permit partisan enforcement magnifies the problem
of content discrimination. Second, the FCC would not be required to
stringently adhere to consistently articulated standards for determining "reasonable" access. When standards are not clearly articulated and are selectively
enforced, result-oriented decision-making motivated by partisan concerns becomes possible. Third, the FCC would be permitted to substitute its judgment
for the broadcaster's. Such a system impermissibly compromises the autonomy
of the press.
To guard against these Froblems, when the FCC upsets a broadcaster's discretion, appellate courts should examine the broadcaster's action and defer
to the broadcaster's judgment if it is based upon adequate reasons even though
the FCC might offer a more reasonable analysis. Additionally, appellate courts
should not defer to the FCC's interpretation of the proposed statute, if that
interpretation sharply limits the broadcaster's discretion. The FCC cannot
make words mean just what it would like them to mean. Only unequivocal
legislative intent can be the justification for a substantial reduction in broadcaster discretion. If the legislative history of section 312(a)(7) serves as a model
for the proposed access statute, some measure of access would be established.
The speaker's needs, however, would not be the foremost consideration in
evaluating access requests under the proposed access.
By applying the dissent's approach in CBS or Judge Leventhal's approach
in NBC to the proposed statute, the FCC would be expected to select standards
that comport with legislative history, to consistently articulate and enforce
those standards, and to refrain from substituting its judgment for the broadcaster's. Nonetheless, a special standard of review can only ensure the FCC
does not favor certain speakers or viewpoints; it cannot correct the content
discrimination problem posed by the provision permitting broadcasters to
refuse to provide free time. A special reviewing standard also cannot eliminate
the effect of threatened litigation on a broadcaster's decisions. Furthermore,
when courts examine a broadcaster's categorization of a given message as "commercial," the new problem of separating commercial and noncommercial expression arises, which is very difficult to resolve.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 118-22.
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CBS dealt only with the problem of defining reasonable access because the
Carter-Mondale program undoubtedly fell within the provisions of section
312(a)(7). 210 Treating requests for reasonable access becomes more difficult
when one considers the additional problem of determining whether a message
is commercial or noncommercial speech. The Supreme Court has never explicitly defined commercial speech and prefers to treat commercial speech
cases through a loose balancing process that lacks a clear framework.211 This
section traces the development of the Court's commercial speech doctrine and
explores the problems posed by attempts to distinguish commercial expression
from noncommercial expression. 12
From Valentine to Central Hudson

In Valentine v. Chrestensen,213 the Court in a "casual, almost offhand"214
manner upheld a prohibition on distribution in public streets of purely commercial advertising.215 After examining a handbill that contained a commercial
advertisement on one side and a protest against a government action on the
other, the Court dismissed as unfounded a lower court's expressed fear that
it would be difficult to distinguish content of public interest from content for
210. The question of whether a given message or program falls within the provisions
of § 312(a)(7) has not been a significant past of the operation or interpretation of the statute.
See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 174; Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to
the Communications Act Made by the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516 (1974);
Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510 (1972).
See generally Note, The Right of "Reasonable Access" for Federal Political Candidates
Under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 78 COLUm L. Rxv. -1287 (1978).
211. Justice Stewart commented that as long as members of the Court "view the First
Amendment as no more than a set of 'values' to be balanced against other 'values,' that
Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 402 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally Cox,
Foreword:Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HIv.
L. REv. 1 (1980); Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 Ca. L. REv.

422 (1980).
212. See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IowA L. REv. 1 (1976); Barrett, "The Uncharted Area" -Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 U.C.D.L. Rav. 175 (1980); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1977); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. Ray.
372 (1979); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979); Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating
Commercial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 437 (1980); Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Gao. WAS. L. REv.
429 (1971); Comment, Regulating Commercial Speech: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis,
32 BAYLOR L. REv. 235 (1980); Comment, supra note 50; Comment, The Right to Receive
and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. LJ. 775

(1975).
213. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
214. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514- (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
215. 3,16 U.S. at 54.
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private profit.2 16 The protest, the Court believed, was merely attached to the
advertisement to evade the ordinance prohibiting distribution of commercial
advertising.217 A message distributed in an advertisement, however, does not
always forfeit full first amendment protection.
In a subsequent decision, 218 the Court distinguished the Valentine handbill from an advertisement soliciting support for a civil rights group. The
Court found the civil rights advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern.- 21 9 In contrast to the civil
rights advertisement, the Court later found that sex-designated employment
advertisements closely resembled the advertisement in Valentine because they
were no more than an offer of prospective employment. 22 0 As such, these advertisements could be prohibited. Expression that does no more than propose
a commercial transaction, in the Court's view, constitutes a classic form of
221
commercial speech.
The definition of commercial speech as that which does no more than propose a commercial transaction is seriously underinclusive. Valentine and its
progeny raise important questions about the treatment of predominately
commercial expression that does more than merely propose a commercial
transaction. In Bigelow v. Virginia,222 the Court reversed a newspaper editor's
conviction for distributing information encouraging abortion and concluded
the first amendment protected the advertisement in question because it
"contained factual material of clear 'public interest.' "223 In dissent, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, argued an advertisement's subject ought
to make no difference in determining whether the first amendment protected
the advertisement. 224 Justice Rehnquist believed the advertisement in question
216. Id. at 55.
217. Id. For criticism of the Court's analysis, see Redish, supra note 212, at 452.
218. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
219. Id. at 266.
220. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 US. 376, 385
(1973).
221. Id.
222. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
223. Id. at 822. Portions of the advertisement, the Court stated, involve the freedom of
communicating information and opinion, and this information was deemed to be newsworthy.
Id. The Court added:
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential
and value to a diverse audience- not only to readers possibly in need of the
offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest
subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers
reform in Virginia.

interest
services
in, the
seeking

Id.
224. Id. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice White). Justice Rehnquist
argued that if Virginia may not regulate abortion advertising "because of the interest of
those seeking to reform Virginia's abortion laws, it is difficult to see why it is not likewise
precluded from regulating advertising for an out-of-state bucket shop on the ground that
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could not be distinguished from those at issue in decisions involving classic
commercial expression. The dissent argued the message's slight factual and
225
opinion-oriented content did not change its essentially commercial character.
Bigelow created a curious discrepancy in first amendment policy because
the Court had earlier concluded that in libel cases, determining what constitutes
a matter of public interest should not be committed to the conscience of

judges. 226 The problems Bigelow created were quickly swept aside, however,
when the Court held in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Counci 22 7 that the first amendment protects speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.228 The Court believed that
purely commercial advertising was of general interest 229 and that. almost all
commercial messages could have an element of public interest added to them.
More importantly, the Court suggested "no line between publicly 'interesting'
or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be
While not closely defining commercial speech, the Virginia Pharmacy

Court noted speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction
differs from other forms of expression. Commercial slieech can be verified
more easily by its disseminator, and commercial speech may be more durable
than other kinds of expression. 23 1 Consequently, the Court found commercial
speech should be protected to a lesser degree than noncommercial speech to
guarantee truthful and legitimate commercial expression. 22 As the Court
subsequently observed, the protection available for a particular commercial
such information might be of interest to those interested in repealing Virginia's 'blue sky'
laws." Id.
225. Id. at 831-32.
226. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).

227. 425 US. 748 (1976).
228. Id. at 761-7.1.
229. Id. at 764. The Court commented:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for
what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 US. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
230. 425 U.S. at 765.
231. Id. at 771 n.24. But see Farber, supranote 212, at 385-86.
232. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 98 (1977). In his dissenting opinion in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Rehnquist argued
that the Court had substituted "for the waivering line previously thought to exist between
commercial speech and protected speech a no more satisfactory line of its own - that between
'truthful' commercial speech, on the one hand, and that which is 'false and misleading' on the
other." 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The difficulty with the Court's line, he
stated, is not that it waivers, but that it is simply "too Procrustean to take into account the
congeries of factors" he believed would influence a legislative decision to regulate commercial
expression. Id.
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expression turns on both the nature of the expression and the governmental
233
interests in its regulation.
Since the Court conferred less first amendment protection on commercial
speech than on other categories of speech, it is important to have dear definitions and categorization schemes. The Court later warned in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association234 that equivalent constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech could dilute first amendment guarantees
with regard to noncommercial expression. 23 5 With imprecise categories, speech
that could be legitimately regulated may often not be regulated, while speech
that should be unregulated could fall within the zone of subordinate protection
233. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980). In cases following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has done little to clarify the boundary
between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising. Clearly, however, the Court views certain
types of commercial messages as possessing great possibilities for deception. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (ban on trade names for the practice of optometry). See also
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 391-95 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 774-75 (1976, (Burger, C.J., concurring). While deceptive commercial
speech may be restrained, the Court will look closely at the reasons advanced for a prohibition
of a type of commercial expression. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-79
(1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977). Designing a restraint on
nondeceptive commercial speech to prevent a certain behavior by the recipients of the information does not sufficiently justify the restraint. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977).
Commercial speech may also be subjected to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
In Carey, Justices Powell and Stevens in concurring opinions advocated that content could
be considered in the regulation of time, place, and manner of contraceptive advertisements.
431 U.S. at 712 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 71617 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part. and concurring in the judgment). While Justice Powell
limited his comments to the special problems of the broadcast media, Justice Stevens' view is
much more disturbing. Closely reflecting the ideas of his opinions in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (the government may use the content of
sexually-oriented motion pictures as the basis for placing them in a different classification
from other motion pictures), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (broadcast
material which is indecent lies at the periphery of first amendment concerns), Justice Stevens
stated that the "offensive character" of the communication may affect its regulation. He
added:
fact that the advertising of a particular subject matter is sometimes offensive
Ihe
does not deprive all such advertising of First Amendment protection; but it is equally
clear to me that the existence of such protection does not deprive the State of all
power to regulate such advertising in order to minimize its offensiveness.
431 U.S. at 717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although
Justice Stevens gave no definition for the term offensive, the term probably could not be
defined in a manner that would prevent arbitrary enforcement. The use of the term offensive
in obscenity has been engulfed by debate, and Justice Stevens has stated that the "line
between communications which 'offend' and those which do not is too blurred to identify
criminal conduct. It is also too blurred to delimit the protections of the First Amendment."
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is difficult to
perceive how offensiveness could be applied in the commercial speech area without significant damage to first amendment interests.
234. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Compare id. with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
235. 436 U.S. at 456.
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and could be regulated in a manner that "might be impermissible in the realm
23 ,
of noncommercial expression.
The dilution of first amendment protection for noncommercial expression
warned against in Ohralik occurred, according to Justice Rehnquist, in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.v. PublicService Commission of New York.2 7 The
CentralHudson Court found unconstitutional a utility commission order that
permitted institutional advertising 238 by utilities, but prohibited promotional
advertising.239 Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the four-part test 240 the
Court applied in CentralHudson elevated the protection of commercial speech
to "a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial
speech.1 241 Justice Rehnquist reiterated his view that the first amendment
should not protect commercial speech and concluded:
236. Id.

237. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
238. The majority defined institutional and information advertising as advertising not
clearly intended to promote sales. Id. at 559. For example, an advertisement designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand periods to low demand periods was
considered to be informational. Id. at 560.
239. Promotional advertising was intended to promote the purchase of utility services.
Id. at 559. The majority viewed the public service commission order as prohibiting those
advertisements that would encourage consumption of energy, but would result in a net energy
savings. Id. at n.l. See infra note 240. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that advertisements resulting in a net energy savings were consistent with the order. 447 U.S. at 604-05
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
240. Commercial speech regulations must be analyzed according to four questions:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest..
447 U.S. at 566. The expression in this case unquestionably was not deceptive or related to
unlawful activity, but the Court focused its analysis of the first question on the identity
of the speaker, holding that Central Hudson's monopoly status did not alter first amendment
protection for its commercial speech. Id. at 568. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 nJ (1980). Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (the inherent worth of speech does not depend upon
the identity of its source). Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that a utility with monopoly
power should be subject to much more wide-ranging supervision and control than would
be permissible with regard to ordinary corporations. 447 U.S. at 587 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court concluded that energy conservation and fair and efficient rates were substantial governmental interests. 447 U.S. at 568-69. The tenuous link, however, between the
advertising ban and the utility's rate structure was constitutionally inadequate for restricting
speech. Id. at 569. The interest in energy conservation was believed by the Court to be
directly advanced by the ban on promotional advertising. Id. The Court found the order
to be more extensive than necessary, stating that the order "reaches all promotional advertising regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use. But the energy
conservation rationale, as, important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about
electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use." Id. at 570.
See supra note 238.
241. 447 U.S. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist objected to the re-
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The line between "commercial speech," and the kind of speech that
those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a
technically or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far
of judicial doctrine in this
fewer problems than has the development
242
area since Virginia Pharmacy Board.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in CentralHudson also expressed Justice
Rehnquist's concern about the difficulty of distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech and ensuring full protection for noncommercial expression.
Justice Stevens worried that given commercial speech's subordinate value under
the first amendment, it cannot be categorized too broadly, lest expression de243
serving greater first amendment protection be unintentionally suppressed.
He criticized the Court for using two definitions of commercial speech in
Central Hudson: expression relating solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and the audience, 2" and speech proposing a commercial transaction.24
The first, he argued, was too broad and raised the problems of content and
motive analysis;246 the second was too narrow. 247 Whatever the precise contours
of commercial speech might be, it should not include the entire range of communication embraced by the term "promotional advertising." 248 An electric
company's advocacy of electric heat for environmental reasons, for example,
would fall under the ban on promotional advertising, even though the message
would also fall within the "bounds of maximum first amendment protection."249
quirement that the government may not regulate commercial speech unless it has a substantial reason for doing so. rd. He preferred to view the order at issue as more akin to
economic regulation "to which virtually complete deference should be accorded by this
Court." Id. This approach brings to mind the disturbing statement in Bigelow that commercial speech, "like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves

a legitimate public interest." 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (emphasis added). Apparently Justice
Rehnquist believed that regulation of commercial speech must only be reasonable while
regulation of noncommercial speech requires substantial governmental interests.
242. 447 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
244. Id. at 501.
245. Id. at 562.
246. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens stated:
Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an economist's dissertation on the
money supply, should receive any lesser protection because the subject matter concerns
only the economic interests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a
speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward.
Id. In the realm of sexually-oriented speech, Justice Stevens does not oppose content-based
regulation. See supranote 235.
247. 447 U.S. at 580. See supra text accompanying notes 222-25.
248. 447 U.S. at 680.
249. Id. at 591. The "blurry line" between the categories of speech in this case, Justice
Stevens believed, would have the effect of restraining expression that was close to the line,
or force the utility company to seek advice from the utility commission. Justice Stevens felt
that the "Commission does not possess the necessary expertise in dealing with these sensitive
free speech questions; and in any event, ordinary speech entitled to maximum First Amendment protection may not be subjected to a prior clearance procedure with a government
agency." Id. at n.4. The majority, on the other hand, drew upon Freedman v. Maryland,
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In response to Justice Stevens' arguments, the majority in Central Hudson
stated promotional advertising, which includes claims relating to questions
frequently debated and discussed in the political arena, cannot be given maxi-

mum first amendment protection. 250 The majority feared Justice Stevens' approach would grant broad first amendment protection to any advertising that
links a product to a current public debate. The.majority noted many, if not
most, products may be tied to public concerns like the environment, energy,
or health and safety. 251 The Court had previously observed 252 that when utilities

directly comment on public issues, their expression is entitled to maximum
first amendment protection. Comments on public issues that are made in the
context of commercial transactions, the Court determined, are entitled to lesser
2 53
first amendment protection.

The Central Hudson majority did not define "commercial transactions"

and its analysis is admirable only in the sense that it is designed to avoid the
problem Bigelow posed: determination of an advertisement's status based upon

the presence of statements on a matter of public interest. The majority's shortsighted analysis of the different types of speech perceives messages as falling
into two primary categories: first, purely commercial messages such as "I will
sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price," 2 14 or second, purely non-

commercial messages such as a statement favoring nuclear power.255 To the
extent the majority recognizes hybrid speech, it perceives only the possibility
of predominately commercial messages that also contain a reference to a public

issue. This position leaves unanswered the questions of how to categorize a
message on a matter of public interest containing only a slight reference to a
commercial transaction and how to recognize the point at which the context of
commercial transactions begins. Central Hudson did not adequately resolve
the difficult problem of determining the status of hybrid messages.
The Problem of Hybrid Speech
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,2 56 the Court found a municipal
outdoor sign ordinance unconstitutional because on-site commercial messages
380 U.S. 51 (1965), and claimed that a prescreening arrangement can pass constitutional
muster if it includes adequate procedural safeguards. 447 U.S. at 571 n.13. Hopefully, the
principle endorsed by this passage will never be fulfilled. Freedman must be read as applying
only to the medium of motion pictures, which the Court has noted present "peculiar
problems." Joseph 2Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). See generally Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
250. 447 U.S. at 562 n.5.
251. Id.
252. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
253. Id. at 562 n.5.
254. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
255. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
532 (1980).
256. 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). See generally Comment, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and the Realities of Billboard Control, 9 EcoIOay
L.Q. 295 (1981). For the the Court's application of the Central Hudson test for commercial
speech regulations, see 101 S. Ct. at 2892-95.
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were permitted, but noncommercial messages were generally prohibited. Because noncommercial messages have greater first amendment protection than
commercial messages, the Court found the ordinance effectively inverted the
2 7
degree of protection afforded commercial and noncommercial expression.
The ordinance contained exceptions for certain types of noncommercial
messages, such as temporary political campaign signs and religious symbols.
Writing for the Court, Justice White stated that a city may distinguish between
categories of commercial speech, but may not distinguish with the same freedom
between the various communicative interests present within the category of
noncommercial speech.as
Justice Brennan, joined in his concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun,
feared that the Court's bifurcated approach raised serious first amendment
problems by relying upon an unprecedented distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech. 259 He believed communities would view the Court's
approach as a signal that they could prohibit commercial signs, but must
allow noncommercial signs. ": 0 Such ordinances would create great difficulties
because city officials would have the right to determine whether proposed
messages were commercial or noncommercial. 261 Justice Brennan claimed that
this distinction is anything but dear262 and argued that cases such as Virginia
257. 101 S. Ct. at 2895.
258. Id. at 2896. Justice White stated that a city may not conclude that messages communicating commercial information regarding goods and services available at a particular
site contain greater value than messages communicating noncommercial information. Id. at
2895. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated:
By allowing communication of certain commercial ideas via billboards, but forbidding
noncommercial signs altogether, a city does not necessarily place a greater "value" on
commercial speech. In these situations, the city is simply recognizing that it has
greater latitude to distinguish among various forms of commercial communication
when the same distinctions would be impermissible if undertaken with regard to noncommercial speech.
Id. at 2923-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 2900 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
260. Id. The plurality did not view the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on outdoor
advertising, id. at 2896 n.20, and concluded that a city may ban off-site commercial advertisements. Id. at 2899 n.25. Justice Brennan preferred to view the ordinance as a total ban, id. at
2902 (Brennan, J., concurring the judgment), stating that for those who could not afford to
buy or lease premises in the city, and whose messages did not fall within the narrow exceptions of the ordinance, the billboard was eliminated as a medium of communication. Id.
at 2901. In their dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens and Rehnquist stated that a total ban
on billboards would be constitutional. See id. at 2915 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2924
(Rehnquist,,J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2907 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan believed
that the plurality erred "in assuming that a governmental unit may be put in the position
in the first instance of deciding whether the proposed speech is commercial or noncommercial." Id. (emphasis deleted). He added that it is one thing for a court to classify
expression, but it is quite another for a city to do so for the purpose of deciding what messages
may be communicated on billboards. Id. at 2908.
262. Id. at 2907. Justice Brennan reiterated his belief that the line between ideological
and nonideological speech is impossible to draw with accuracy. Id. at 2909 (quoting Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 319 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). But cf. Virginia
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Pharmacy Board and Bigelow recognize the difficulty of distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial speech. 26 Accurately perceiving the
possibility of hybrid speech, Justice Brennan concluded that those who seek
to convey commercial messages will attempt to utilize innovative techniques of
conveying those messages within the protective shelter of noncommercial expression. 64 Because determining the status of such messages would require a
city's officials to exercise substantial discretion, Justice Brennan feared noncommercial expression would be curtailed "in the guise of regulating com2
mercial speech." 6
While the proposed access statute does not entail a ban on commercial expression, it does present the problem of distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech. The Court has demanded that sensitive tools be used to
separate protected and unprotected expression. 26 Similarly, sensitive tools must
also be used to separate commercial and noncommercial speech. Justice Brennan
has criticized the Court's efforts in the area of obscenity, noting that the Court
has failed to formulate a standard that sharply distinguishes the obscene from
the nonobscene.267 The same can be said of the Court's commercial speech
cases, where the Court has done little to establish standards that sharply distinguish commercial from noncommercial expression. The proposed access
statute offers a more elaborate definition of commercial speech than the Court
has ever employed.2S This definition seems to be a workable standard for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial expression in most instances. The
treatment of hybrid expression under the proposed statute, however, presents
the very large problem of subjective analysis and arbitrary categorization of
26 9
expression.
Under the proposed access statute, those messages that both discuss public
issues and refer to a product would be categorized as commercial speech if the
reference to the product could be deleted with no loss of meaning or implication for the remaining parts of the message.270 This standard has appeal, for
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ,(commercial speech differs markedly from ideological expression because it is confined to the promotion of goods or services).
263. 101 S. Ct. at 2908-09 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
264. Id. at 0909.
265. Id. at 2907. Justice Brennan stated that he would be unhappy to see city officials
dealing with messages such as the following by the owner of an ice cream shop: "Joe says to
support dairy price supports; they mean lower prices for you at his Shoppe." Id. at 2908.
266. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
267. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
269. Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85 n.6 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the concept of obscenity is incapable of definition, with sufficient clarity to withstand
attack on vagueness grounds). In Roth v. Uftited States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court
optimistically believed that there ,may be difficult cases in which it is hard to determine
where the expression in question falls. Id. at 491-92. On the contrary, Justice Brennan stated
in Paris Adult Theatre that the Court's experience with obscenity revealed that almost
every case is "marginal." 41. U.S. at 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).,
270. This standard is drawn from Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam),
which addressed the problem of hybrid expression in the obscenity context. A newspaper
article about the arrest of one of the newspaper's photographers for the possession of obscene
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a Kaiser statement attacking the bias of news coverage of a Kaiser product
would be rather stark, and perhaps pointless, without reference to that product.
The greatest problem with this standard, however, is that it is highly subjective
and fails to establish the point at which a reference to a product or service
becomes unnecessary to the meaning or implication of a message. 27 1 The Court
has refused to commit to judges the task of determining what constitutes a
matter of public interest because of a fear of ad hoc subjective decisions. 272 The
task of categorizing hybrid speech under the proposed access statute would be
no less subjective than the determination of what is a matter of public interest.
The problem with hybrid expression in this area arises from an inability
to develop an objective standard. Before accepting the process of subjective
analysis for judicial categorization of hybrid expression, it must be recognized
that the proposed access statute requires a broadcaster, in the first instance, to
categorize a particular message or program. A party whose hybrid message
is rejected because it is considered to be commercial has the option of deleting
the product references and resubmitting the message, or filing a complaint with
the FCC. It is one thing for a court to categorize expression for the purposes
of regulating deceptive commercial speech; it is quite another to place a broadcaster in the position of categorizing expression and then subjecting those decisions to FCC scrutiny.
A purely commercial advertiser who does not make a request for reasonable access under the proposed statute has absolutely no recourse to the FCC
when a broadcaster refuses to carry an advertisement. 273 On the other hand,
material was accompanied by two photographs similar to those seized from the photographer.
In reversing the petitioner's conviction for dissemination of obscene material, the Court
found that the newspaper article was not a mere vehicle for publication of the photographs
and that the photographs were "rationally related" to an article that was fully protected by
the first amendment. Id. at 231. In contrast, the Court stated that a quotation from Voltaire
in the flyleaf of a book will not redeem an otherwise obscene publication. Id. See Comment,
supra note 50, at 232.
.271. In addition, it is difficult in certain instances to separate products from a matter of
public interest. See, e.g., Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son,
364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (manufacturer of artificial furs promoting his product as an
alternative to the extinction of fur-bearing mammals by his competitors). The author of the
standard utilized in the proposed access statute advocated that in those cases in which a
product itself is a controversial issue, "courts should consider whether the reference to the
brand name product is made to condition the market for the product or to contribute to the
discussion of public issues." Comment, supra note 50, at 232 n.156. This approach presents two
primary problems. First, some messages may both condition the market for a product and
contribute to the discussion of public issues. Second, this analysis requires an evaluation of
intent or purpose. While it may be acceptable for a court to consider these questions for the
purpose of regulating deceptive commercial speech, it may not be acceptable to make a
broadcaster to do so for the purpose of determining access to broadcasting. To the extent that
commentators have addressed the problem of hybrid commercial/noncommercial speech, their
analysis offers no greater precision or objectivity than the approach presented in the proposed access statute. See Barrett, supra note 212, at 204-05; Farber, supra note 212, at 389-90.
272. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
273. Broadcasters routinely reject advertisements on grounds such as taste. See generally
1981 BROADCASTN.G/CABLE YEARBOOK D15-22. The National Association of Broadcasters
recently suspended enforcement of its advertising code, see BROADCASTNG, Mar. 15, 1982, at
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an advertiser would have recourse to the FCC when a request under the
proposed statute is denied because the broadcaster considers a hybrid message
to be commercial. This recourse would be of limited value to an advertiser.

The message may well lose its timeliness by the time the complaint is resolved
in the advertiser's favor. Whether the FCC reviews a broadcaster's categorization of a given message according to a standard of reasonableness or makes its
own de novo findings, 274 broadcasters would be faced with intensive govern-

mental scrutiny. Additionally, the FCC's experience with the fairness doctrine
and advertising provides little hope that the Commission could deal with the
problem of hybrid expression in a uniform manner. 2- Even if courts give a

45, but little change can be expected in broadcast industry advertising acceptance practices.
See BROADCASTING, Mar. 22, 1982, at 79.
274. Compare NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting rehearing en banc) with The
Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, 58 F.C.C2d 691, 697 (1976). See supra notes 186 & 192.
275. In 1967, the FCC found the fairness doctrine applicable to cigarette advertisements. WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C2d. 381, stay and reconsideration denied, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967),
afJ'd sub nom., Banzhaff v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Tobacco
Inst. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Commissioner Loevinger accurately foresaw that the FCC
would have difficulty distinguishing cigarette advertisements from those for other products
that pose health problems, 9 F.C.C.2d at 954 (Loevinger, Comm'r, concurring), and one
commentator described the FCC's application of the fairness doctrine to advertisements after
Banzhaff as a "crazy quilt." See Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine:
The New F.C.C. Policy in Perspective, 75 COLUm. L. Rv. 1083, 1089 (1975). Cases in which the
FCC found the fairness doctrine applicable to the advertisements in question include: Media
Access Project, 44 F.C.C.2d 755 (1973) (power company advertisements stating a position on a
proposed rate increase); Center for Auto Safety, 32 F.C.C.2d 926 (1972) (air bags); Wilderness
Soc'y, 30 F.C.C.2d 926 (1972) (oil company advertisements discussing the difficulty of arctic oil
exploration and efforts to preserve the ecology). Cases in which the FCC found the fairness
doctrine not applicable to the advertisements in question include: Sierra Club, 45 F.C.C.2d
833 (1974) (automobile and gasoline advertisements); John S. MacInnis, 32 F.C.C.2d 837 (1971)
(trash compactors); Alan F. Neckritz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971), reconsidered, 37 F.C.C.2d 528
(1972), aff'd sub nom., Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (gasoline advertisement claiming product reduces air pollution); Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970).
rev'd sub nom., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), reconsidered on
remand, 33 F.C.C.2d 648 (1972) (automobile and gasoline advertisements); David C. Green,
24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970), aff'd sub nom., Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (1971) (armed forces recruitment messages).
Dean Burch, chairman of the FCC, stated that this was a "chaotic mess." Wilderness
Soc'y, 31 F.C.C.2d 729, 734 (1971) (Burch, Comm'r, concurring). Accordingly, in 1974 the
FCC adopted new standards for the fairness doctrine and advertising. Editorial advertisements, the FCC stated, would be covered by the fairness doctrine when the advertisement
"presents a meaningful statement which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view
on, a controversial issue of public importance." The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1,
23 (1974). Product advertisements, the FCC stated, would not be covered by the fairness
doctrine in the absence of "some meaningful or substantive discussion... on any side of a
controversial issue of public importance." Id. at 26. The FCC examines the subjective process
of determining what is an issue of public importance to determine if the broadcaster has
been reasonable in its decision-making. One commentator analyzed the FCCs standards in
this area and concluded:
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broadcaster's categorization of a message special protection through the type
of appellate review Judge Leventhal advocated in NBC, 27 6 the prospect of a
lengthy and costly legal defense is not inviting. In order to avoid expense
caused by complaints about a categorization of hybrid messages, broadcasters
may prefer to err in favor of granting access to them. This would encourage
speakers to engage in the imaginative exercises Justice Brennan feared in
Metromedia. To argue that such effects merely increase the flow of information in our society disregards the autonomy broadcasters should enjoy under
the first amendment and looks gently at the coercion involved.
CONCLUSION

The effective functioning of our society depends upon the flow of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.2 77 Something is seriously wrong
when products are freely promoted on network television, but the presentation
of controversial views is sharply limited. It is tempting to yield to the call of
government content regulation as a means of solving this problem. However,
this is one siren's call that must not be followed, for government content
2
regulation is one cause of the problem.

78

In addition to the flow of information from diverse sources, other factors
27 9
The
foster our interest in perpetuating a system of freedom of expression.

importance of an autonomous press requires that even if a broadcaster's first
amendment rights may be limited in exchange for the use of a scarce resource,
courts must carefully weight any gains from such a limitation against the
hazards of increased governmental scrutiny of programming decisions. Courts
must also probe access systems for content-discriminatory effects, an effort
lacking in CBS. Moreover, the troublesome possibility of Supreme Court deference to congressional judgment would arise if the proposed access statute
were enacted.
The question of reasonableness does not lend itself readily to standardized judgments.
That the government acts as the sole arbiter of the issue exacerbates the problems
associated with such inherent. arbitrariness. As long as the decision rests with the
agency, there is always the risk that the doctrine will be used to censor, ultimately
restricting, rather than expanding, the broadcast of necessary viewpoints on the airways.
Note, Advocacy Advertising: A Question of Fairness and the Reasonable Agency, 27 CAm.
U.L. REV. 785, 802 (1978). See generally Note, Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product
Advertising, 76 MicH. L. Rv. 498 (1978); Note, The Fairness Doctrine and Access to Reply
to Product Commercials, 51 IND. L.J. 756 (1976).
.276. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
277. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
278. The networks cite the fairness doctrine as a major reason for not accepting controversial noncommercial advertising. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. The inhibiting
effects of the fairness doctrine have been widely discussed. See, e.g., First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 95th Gong., 2d Sess. (1978).
279. Justice Stewart, in the context of a mandatory right of access, warned of the
dangers "when we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit
of its 'values.'" CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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As this article reveals, the proposed statute would markedly increase FCC
scrutiny of programming decisions. If appellate courts intensely review FCC
decisions that upset a broadcaster's discretion, an unlikely proposition given
the deference courts have generally given the FCC, the mere process of defending one's: decisions still has a significant impact on the autonomy of broadcasters. 280 Furthermore, regardless of the type of review appellate courts give
the categorization of hybrid messages, a higher degree of subjectivity and imprecision than the first amendment can permit permeates this area of regulation.
By coupling the problems of governmental scrutiny with the problem of
content discrimination, the proposed access statute's benefits seem small indeed.
Freeing broadcasters from government content regulation, a policy option
some in the communications policy arena currently advocate,28l would probably
lessen the problem of networks denying access for controversial noncommercial
expression. This freedom would entail a gamble, but like the first amendment's
framers, we should dare to believe that a free press is more desirable than one
subject to close governmental scrutiny. As Chief Justice Burger stated in DNC:
Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values.
The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill
of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils for which there
was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a sense
of responsibility - and civility - on282the part of those who exercise the
guaranteed freedoms of expression.
A free press is a condition of a free society,2s 3 and the first amendment is the
cord restraining us from heeding a dangerous siren's call.
280. See supra note 95.

281. Address by Sen. Bob Packwood, National Association of Broadcasters Annual Convention, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 5, 1982); BRoADCAsTING, Apr. 12, 1982, at 34-35 (report of
address by Mark S. Fowler, chairman of the FCC, advocating elimination of broadcast content
regulation).
282. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
283. Associated Press v. United States, 25 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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